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- II. *Policy*: The editors will welcome contributions that are likely to be helpful in the furtherance of the aims set forth above. It will be required of such contributions that they be frank and fair in their discussion of moot questions; that they be free from controversial animus; and that their contents be of real scholarly and practical value to the readers. Difference of opinion between contributors, or between a contributor and the editors, does not of itself exclude articles from publication since the editors do not hold themselves responsible for the opinions of contributors.

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Freedom and Its Meanings

BY NORMAN MELCHERT

MOST of the words which deal with things important to human life have a galaxy of meanings which hover about an ill-defined center rather than one meaning which can be easily specified. Thus it is not surprising that the word "freedom" also suffers from an overplus of meaning. Although there is the danger of artificiality in making clear distinctions in the meanings of such words, it must be attempted. The alternative is ambiguity and confusion. This essay is an attempt to make several important distinctions in the general area we call "human freedom" and to develop their importance for the theological doctrine of man. I shall first try to distinguish several meanings briefly and then discuss two of them at greater length.

I

1. One of the meanings of "freedom," a meaning I do not mean to discuss, is that of political or social freedom. It is mentioned here only to be clearly dismissed from our thought.

2. A second meaning of "freedom" is that freedom which is knowledge of necessity. Example: If I know that a match which is not extinguished will eventually burn the fingers, I am free (in normal circumstances) not to suffer a burn. Such freedom is in no way incompatible with determinism (*all* events have a cause and *no* event is self-caused). Indeed, at least a limited determinism (*some* events have a cause) is required for this sort of freedom to be possible. If I never knew whether the match would immediately go out or explode, I would hardly be free to deal with it intelligently.

Surely this is an important aspect of man's freedom. It is that with which much psychoanalysis works. In greatly simplified form the thesis could be stated thus: If we can come to know the causes of our psychological difficulties, we can free ourselves from their domination; in so far as we have knowledge of our past, we are free from it. But this freedom is not the center of my concern here either.

3. We come to one of the two poles around which the discussion

will move when free will and determinism are mentioned. Here we approach an immensely difficult and vexed point, a point on which serious debate has continued from earliest times to the present. And no commonly accepted solution seems in sight.

What compounds the difficulties is that there is no agreed upon *method* by which to solve the problem. What a gulf separates the methods (and results) of a behavioristic psychologist from the intuitive and metaphysical method of certain philosophers! And how does one choose between methods? Who or what decides the proper method for dealing with a problem of this sort?

These are very large problems, and I cannot claim to solve them. The position of this essay on these matters should be made clear, however. That I may do more than stand gaping at the complexity of the problem of method, I shall proceed by a rather common-sense phenomenological analysis, similar to that of the Boston philosopher Peter Bertocci or the Englishman C. A. Campbell.

This should be enough to suggest that I consider the free-will determinism problem to be primarily of a philosophical nature. We shall see that this will be one mark which distinguishes it from the other pole of our discussion (4, below), whose nature is primarily religious. I say "primarily" in each case because, though they are distinct, the problems are closely related.

It is time to define terms more carefully. By "freedom" in this sense I mean freedom of the will, the ability of man to initiate a chain of causes which is not in itself locked in a strictly causal chain. By its opposite, "determinism," I mean that man is *completely* the product of precedent necessary causes; man himself may, of course, act as a cause, but only in the sense that a billiard ball, when set in motion by a precedent cause, is then a cause of future motion. If man is completely determined, he could not at any moment be different than he is or act in any other way than he actually does—unless his past had been different. Thus I shall use the word "determinism" in the sense of *absolute* determinism.

4. There is still a fourth meaning of "freedom," a meaning which is important for theology and one which has not always been clearly distinguished from free will. This is the freedom which Martin Luther expounds in his *Christian Liberty*, the "freedom of the Christian

man." It has been variously called the "freedom of fulfillment"¹ and "being in love."² It is the freedom man experiences when he is living in accord with his origin, his nature, and his destiny—the "glorious liberty of the children of God" (Rom. 8:21).

Although I believe that this freedom is incompatible with strict determinism (3), it is not determinism which is its opposite. Rather, the opposite of this freedom is Luther's *Bondage of the Will*, slavery to sin and self, the "bondage of corruption" (Rom. 8:21).

It can happen that by not keeping the distinctions clear a denial to the natural man of *freedom of fulfillment* is extended to a denial of *freedom of the will*. But this is a mistake, a mistake of which both Luther and the Confessions may be guilty.

I shall want to hold that the natural man is capable of freedom of the will (in a qualified sense which will be made clear), but that he does not enjoy the freedom of fulfillment. On the other hand, I shall argue that determinism does not adequately characterize the natural man, but that he does suffer from bondage of the will. Perhaps the crucial contention will be that natural man, using his freedom of the will, *can choose* the freedom of fulfillment—but only under certain conditions.

II

It seems that the conception of human freedom reached its zenith in the Renaissance, especially in those thinkers influenced by the revival of Platonism. At no time has the freedom of the individual been so extolled as during this period, when freedom was identified with man's ability to choose anything he wants. The assumption was that he could become anything he might choose. This was, of course, bound up intimately with the doctrine that the soul was the essential part of man, immortal and free, while the body was under the compulsion of instincts and appetites.

Since that time, however, developments in the sciences (particularly in physiology, psychology, and sociology) have decisively refuted this "libertarian" notion of freedom. The evidence is so great that such a conception simply could not be held, even if one were convinced that

1 D. R. G. Owen, *Body and Soul* (Philadelphia, 1956), p. 212.

2 Emil Brunner, *Man in Revolt* (Philadelphia, 1947), p. 269.

it was the biblical testimony. "The enormous part that is played in shaping human character by physical conditions, by sociological forces, by unconscious intuition drives, and by all kinds of psychological mechanics completely refutes the libertarian conception of freedom."³

Thus man is not so free as the Renaissance thought him to be. There are three sets of material factors by which his life is molded and its limits set. The first of these is the strictly physical. The various factors involved (e.g., evolution, the physiological nervous system, the endocrine glands, the physical instincts, and heredity) will only be noted here. It is enough to acknowledge them as determining factors in human life.

The second set of physical factors is that studied by sociology and anthropology. These sciences show conclusively that our social environment determines, to a large extent, what we will be and how we will act. Those values which we believe we have freely and intelligently chosen are likely to turn out to be only the internalized values of our culture.

Freud and his successors point to a third kind of determining factor, the psychological. They show that one's past plays a large part in determining what one is in the present and can become in the future.

It is with qualifications such as these that the assertion of free will must be hedged. Man is not free to choose whatever he will be; there are definite limits put upon him by his heredity, his surroundings, and his personal history. But it may be more accurate to speak of "conditions" than of "determining factors" or "causes." This distinction is made by D. R. G. Owen. "The whole vast, complicated machinery of material forces, physical, social, and psychical, constitute the inescapable material conditions, differing more or less from man to man, within which every one of us must do his thinking, perform his actions, and develop his character."⁴ But conditions are not yet causes; they are necessary, but not sufficient to explain actions. They "set certain limits, and mark out the general lines, within which growth takes place."⁵

It has often seemed as though free will had been dealt a Johannsen-like right to the chin or a Patterson-like left hook to the body by such

3 Owen, *op. cit.*, p. 112.

4 *Ibid.*, p. 155.

5 *Ibid.*, p. 155.

evidence. But the evidence is not yet exhausted. While acknowledging the limiting and shaping force of the material conditions, we shall ask, What evidence is there, briefly, for free will?

There is, first of all, the fact that the experience I have of *willing* does not seem to be the same as any other experience. It is Bertocci's contention that the experience to which we apply the term "will" is qualitatively unique; it is not reducible to another kind of experience (e.g., desire or passion), for it is simply different. And that which distinguishes will from desire is effort. While desire is fairly passive, being elicited from without, will is not; I take a hand in the way things are going—whether it be in changing outward circumstances or in directing my thinking. When I will, I "come to myself as agent and not simply as process or unity in change. . . ."⁶

If this is an accurate description of what is going on (and I think it is), then the will may well stand somehow out of the ordinary chain of causation. To say that the will is free is to say that it can initiate a process and influence future events. This is put in a negative and more modest way by Alexander Petrunkevitch, "What the concept of free choice asserts is that in presence of several alternatives the prediction of the choice is impossible as long as there is no cause present which is great enough to limit the choice or to make it altogether inoperative."⁷ If prediction is *impossible* (in the strict sense), then choice is not caused, and the action of the will in choosing is free.

A second evidence is found in the fact of guilt. I doubt whether an adequate deterministic account of guilt is possible. Determinism seems to give no criterion for distinguishing guilt from anxiety. Bertocci seems to be correct in asserting that guilt and anxiety are not equivalent but qualitatively distinct.⁸ Kierkegaard also makes this distinction. One may be *anxious* regardless of one's responsibility; but one feels *guilt* only where one knows one is responsible for an evil, and that one could have done otherwise than one did in fact do (or, more unambiguously, that one could have *chosen* otherwise). Unless the feeling of guilt is an illusion, it testifies to the fact that in a given situation a man is genuinely free.

6 Peter A Bertocci, *Free Will, Responsibility, and Grace* (New York, 1957), p. 19.

7 Alexander Petrunkevitch, "Choice and Responsibility," in *Transactions of the Connecticut Academy of Arts and Sciences*, Vol. XXXVII (New Haven, Conn., 1949), p. 11.

8 Bertocci, *op. cit.*, pp. 51, 52.

A third kind of evidence is found in the universality of praise and blame for a man's actions. It does not seem to be true to experience to interpret such praise and blame as merely expressions of approval and disapproval; there is more in a word of censure than that, namely, the belief that the individual censured ought not to have done what he did, and that he could have done otherwise. Nor is it a correct interpretation of experience to say, as some do, that praise and blame do not refer to the past, but solely to the future—as causes for future actions; there *is* a reference to the past included in praise or blame and a feeling that the person could have chosen to do otherwise. This feeling is especially strong if I blame myself; I invariably feel that it was in my power to choose the other alternative.

Closely allied with the above is the universal assignment of responsibility to an individual for his actions (in normal circumstances). If a person is completely determined by precedent causes, so that he could in no instance do other than he did, it is nonsense to hold him responsible for an action. Kant was right when he said that "ought" implies "can." Petrunkevitch states it boldly: "Clearly, responsibility has no meaning whatsoever where choice is impossible."⁹ And Brunner adds that determinism means a "complete denial of responsibility."¹⁰ We do hold a man responsible for his actions. And if it can be proved that a man did something by compulsion rather than by his own free choice, we immediately see that he is not to be held responsible.

For the Christian, of course, decisive weight is thrown against the deterministic hypothesis by God's revelation of himself in Jesus Christ, the revelation of love. (In considering this we leave the purely philosophical and reach the limit where religion touches philosophy; it should be clear that there is a difference between the evidence so far considered and that which we now examine.) In the Christian faith responsibility is emphasized in the extreme; for man is understood as being responsible to God, a responsibility which even death cannot terminate.

Responsibility is at its peak in the Christian understanding of sin as rebellion against God. Sin is something for which man is held accountable. If one sins by necessity, however, one cannot be held accountable for it. In fact, "sin by necessity" is an irresolvable con-

9 Petrunkevitch, *op. cit.*, p. 12.

10 Brunner, *op. cit.*, pp. 257, 258.

tradition. Man sins by his own choice, according to his free will. Sin is not *caused* by anything other than man's own election. No doctrine of original sin dare obscure the fact of responsibility for sin. For if responsibility is given up, all of Christianity goes with it.

At this point, however, a problem arises. If we assert so unqualifiedly the freedom of the will, do we not fall back into the errors of the Renaissance? The answer, I believe, is No, and for two reasons.

The first reason why this is not the Renaissance conception of freedom all over again is that the *material conditions* spoken of earlier must be taken seriously. The self does not act in a causal vacuum. The self always acts within the structure of a personality; and personality structure is not easily defied by will. The conditions within which the will acts are given. And this allows for the measure of prediction which psychologists and sociologists are actually able to make.

Yet we must hold that the will is not caused to act by any other internal or external factor. Bertocci makes the distinction between will as *agency* and will as *power*. As agency, will is free. Man can initiate actions which are not predictable on the basis of prior conditions; man is a free *agent*. And yet we must assert that "the self is not free to achieve any objective at will, but is limited in the *power* to reach its objective by many causal factors involved in human experience."¹¹

The second reason why this is not the libertarian conception of freedom is a religious one. Man is always seen as a creature, as dependent upon God for his life and everything that he is and does. The freedom of the creature is "conditioned, relative freedom, freedom in dependence."¹² And if this is kept in mind, man will not be tempted to confuse himself with the divine, as was the tendency in the Renaissance and in the Idealism to which it led.

III

Freedom can also mean "choosing the true end and . . . committing oneself to it."¹³ It is to this meaning we must now turn. By relating oneself absolutely to the absolute and relatively to the relative (Kierkegaard), one becomes truly free. That this is different from freedom

11 Bertocci, *op. cit.*, p. 37.

12 Brunner, *op. cit.*, p. 262.

13 Owen, *op. cit.*, p. 212.

of the will (II, above) is testified to by the Confessions of the Lutheran Church, which distinguish what man can do "in external things affecting this temporal life" from "what the unregenerate man's intellect and will can do in his conversion and regeneration."¹⁴ (This is not the clearest of distinctions, however, tending to oppose what are not opposites: free will and the bondage of the will. But more of this as we proceed.)

The freedom which one has by being constituted by and in and for love is neither the freedom which is knowledge of necessity, nor is it the freedom of the will (though it presupposes free will). In principle at least, even sinful man has retained these forms of freedom; "his thought, his activity, his spiritual life do not lack that element of freedom which distinguishes the spiritual as such from the natural."¹⁵

In antithesis to the freedom of fulfillment stands the slavery of sin and rebellion against God, "bondage of the will." Just as freedom of fulfillment is different from freedom of the will, so is this bondage different from determinism. "The unfreedom, into which man falls through sin, is unfreedom in freedom."¹⁶ In fact, this bondage is not only different from determinism; it is actually incompatible with it. It is a bondage for which we are held responsible, and responsibility argues free will, choice, decision. It is a bondage in sin, and one never sins except by one's own act of decision.

In certain passages of *The Bondage of the Will* it seems as if Luther were aware of the need for not confusing this last kind of freedom with the others. For instance, when he asserts that man sins necessarily, he explains this not as compulsion but as the "necessity of immutability."¹⁷ This would seem to be roughly equivalent to Niebuhr's aphorism that man sins inevitably, but not with necessity. Again, Luther says that without the Holy Spirit a man does evil willingly, not against his will. And when God works in man, the will is changed and acts "not from *compulsion*, but *responsively*, from pure willingness. . . ."¹⁸

But in the great majority of passages Luther speaks like a determinist. I shall give just a few of many possible examples. Luther

14 Formula of Concord, S. D., II, 2.

15 Brunner, *op. cit.*, p. 268.

16 *Ibid.*, p. 267.

17 Martin Luther, *The Bondage of the Will* (Grand Rapids, 1931), p. 72.

18 *Ibid.*, p. 73.

says that if all our good is to be ascribed to God—as it surely is—then “the mercy of God alone does all things, and . . . our own will does nothing, but is rather acted upon.”¹⁹ “Free will” is thrown down by the truth that God “foresees, purposes, and does all things according to his immutable, eternal, and infallible will.”²⁰ “All things take place according to the immutable will of God.”²¹ After his illustration of the will of man as a beast on which either God or Satan rides, Luther says, “Nor is it in the power of its own will to choose to which rider it will run, nor which it will seek; but the riders themselves contend, which shall have and hold it.”²² “Christians . . . are not led by ‘free will’ but by the Spirit of God, . . . and to be led is not to lead but to be impelled, as a saw or an axe is impelled by a carpenter.”²³

Luther and the Confessions allow that man may exercise freedom with regard to things below him (Luther with the proviso that even here man’s free will is overruled by the free will of God). Certainly they are right in this assertion. The problem comes, however, in connection with conversion, man’s abilities over against God. Is man purely passive in conversion? Or does he also act, will, choose, and decide? We here reach the central problem of this essay.

To answer this question we must first look more closely at the sort of bondage into which men get themselves by the exercise of their free will. When we speak of the origin of this bondage, we must speak always of freedom, choice, and decision. And these choices of origin are to be understood not only as those standing at the beginning of the life of an individual or the life of the race; they are the everyday choices we make against God and for ourselves. Through these choices man turns to himself for salvation. In attempting to free himself of the insecurities of his ignorance and weakness and the anxieties of his freedom and responsibility man sins.

But sinful choices determine future lives (at least to a great extent); they initiate habits and traits and solidify structures of personality which limit the *power* of the free will. And so long as the self is left to itself, it cannot escape the bondage to self.

Owen has a schema of three ways in which this bondage works

19 *Ibid.*, pp. 36, 37.

20 *Ibid.*, p. 38

21 *Ibid.*, p. 42.

22 *Ibid.*, p. 74.

23 *Ibid.*, p. 201.

itself out:²⁴ (1) Wrong choices lead to repeated wrong choices, which engender bad habits, which turn into permanent states of character; and one is in bondage; the freedom to live the good life is lost. (2) Wrong choices eventually lead to situations where the only possible alternatives are evil; and the freedom to choose the good is lost. (3) Attempts to live the good life result in pride; and one is in bondage to self; again the good is lost.

We said earlier that the self does not act in a causal vacuum. A large part of the determinedness surrounding the will has been oriented in a sinful direction. By this will *power* is limited, even bound. This is the bondage of the will.

It is time to return to our central problem. Is man merely passive in conversion, or does he choose to become a new man?

Luther and the Confessions, as we have seen, come very close to denying that man's will has anything at all to do in this realm. According to Luther, "the will cannot change itself, nor give itself another bent."²⁵ He says that it is important to know "whether our own will does anything in those things which pertain unto eternal salvation, or is only passive under the work of grace."²⁶ And there is no doubt which alternative he takes.

In the Formula of Concord it is stated that men are attentive to God's Word by the action of the Holy Spirit and "are converted solely through the grace and power of the Holy Spirit, for man's salvation is the Spirit's work alone."²⁷ In interpreting the Formula, C. B. Gohdes asserted that "natural man can make no contribution either of merit or of power to his own conversion."²⁸ And he added, "For the slightest contribution to his own conversion of which man believes himself capable derogates from the sovereignty of grace, and endangers the soul's peace, which rests altogether in God."²⁹

This indicates clearly the concern: that the doctrine of justification by grace alone, through faith, be not obscured. Certainly this is

24 Owen, *op. cit.*, p. 207.

25 *The Bondage of the Will*, p. 73.

26 *Ibid.*, p. 30.

27 Formula of Concord, Epitome, II, 5.

28 C. B. Gohdes, "Is the Teaching of the Second Article of the Formula of Concord Concerning the Freedom of the Will Reactionary?" *The Lutheran Church Review*, Vol. XXVIII (Philadelphia, 1909), p. 553.

29 *Ibid.*, p. 551.

a necessity for any Christian understanding of conversion. But there is good reason to wonder if these statements do not lead to a determinism, a mechanical interpretation which tends to destroy responsibility at the point where it is heightened to the *n*th degree. Gohdes is aware of this danger, but I do not think he avoids it. The problem is sharpened by Bertocci when he says, "If God turns his [man's] will, then the responsibility is his and not man's."³⁰

I think the problem is largely one of *how* God acts in human conversion. Does God *cause* a man to be converted, as a moving billiard ball causes another to move when they meet? The traditional answer would be No, for man is free to reject God's action. But does God *cause* the conversion of one who is actually converted? The traditional answer to this question seems to be Yes. And we find seminarians arguing fiercely that man can say *No* to God but cannot say *Yes*. This paradox seems to me both highly unsatisfactory and unnecessary.

It has always been emphasized that man can contribute to his conversion neither *merit* nor *power*. What is meant by "power" here is not quite clear; but I take it to mean "ability to choose grace, faith, and God when man is confronted with the Gospel." If such *power* is denied man, so is responsibility. We can use Bertocci's *agency/power* distinction to good effect here. (Note that what the Confessions term "power" is approximately what Bertocci calls "agency.") "God does not and cannot change the will agency of a person. . . . To do so is to deny human freedom and responsibility."³¹

But how, then, does God affect us in conversion? I have no exact answer to this, but I am sure that the description of his action must be in personal rather than causal terms. Analogies such as the beast and its riders, the moving of a saw or an axe, a dead man bringing himself back to life, a block or a stone—all are completely inadequate and very misleading because they are all entrenched in a causal scheme. The notion of "cause" is not a personal category.

God's action is always the action of love, and love is personal in the extreme; love cannot be called a "cause." I do not know precisely how my love for my wife and her love for me work to change our relationship; but I do know that things would be different if we did not love each other. Nor can I say that her love for me *causes* me to

30 Bertocci, *op. cit.*, pp. 42, 43.

31 *Ibid.*, pp. 104, 105.

act in such and such a way. Yet that it has a tremendous influence upon me there is no doubt. And so it is with God. If we interpret his action in conversion in terms of "cause," we not only deny human responsibility but we also reduce God to the level of Newtonian mechanics. Love is personal—influential but not causal. Accordingly conversion cannot be attributed to God alone without reference to human action.

Some theologians, attempting to keep the relationship on a personal level and yet deny to natural man the ability to choose the faith alternative, put forward the following analogy. "Did you choose to fall in love with your wife?" they ask, and they liken the relationship of faith to this "falling in love." The obvious answer is, "No, no man chooses (i.e., deliberately decides) to fall in love." It would seem that their case was won, and we must say that natural man does not have the ability to choose faith.

But I suggest that the analogy is a very bad one. Falling in love is neither more nor less than infatuation; and, as anyone who has really fallen can testify, it is something which *happens to* one; it is something for which one cannot be held responsible. One can also *fall out of* love without being responsible.

The correct analogy to the God relationship (and the biblical one) is not infatuation but marriage. This one does choose, sitting down to count the cost. There is a decision involved in getting married, a decision which only the individual can make, and for which he is indeed held responsible. It is this situation which is parallel to becoming a Christian rather than the other.

A large part of the difficulty in this area comes from the constant conjunction of *power* (ability to choose, *agency*) and *merit* in the medieval church. Their close association has been continued in Lutheranism. It is generally assumed that if man *can choose* to respond to God in faith, he gains *merit* in God's eyes for doing so, and God therefore owes him a reward for choosing rightly. I wish to deny this assumption.

I see no reason whatsoever why power and merit are necessarily related. Ability to choose grace when it is offered certainly does not logically *imply* merit for the choice. Suppose we granted that I could and did—of my own free will—choose to accept God's grace, his offer of forgiveness and life. Would I then have any claim upon him for

this? Would I deserve a reward for so choosing? Would I thereby earn the grace which was there before I chose? Would I have any merit in God's sight for my choice? Absolutely not! For I would still be only an unprofitable servant, doing what it was my duty to do. We may well hold that natural man is free to choose to live in God's offered grace and deny that he gains any merit if he does so.

It is important to remember that man, fallen as he is, is still created for fellowship with God. He was not created neutral. And if this is kept clearly in mind, it will also be evident that man gains no merit by choosing what he was made to be. "From the outset man is the property of God; he does not become God's property first of all by his self-determination. Self-determination ought only to accept that which already is, that which already exists."³²

God's grace is not in the least obscured by the assertion that man has the ability to turn himself. The offer of grace is always prior to the human decision. And before a man can return to God, God must come to him; a man must have heard the Gospel. By himself, without Christ, without the Gospel he can only drive himself further into bondage. Conversion is a response of man to the love of God. But before man can respond, he must have experienced God's love for him in Jesus, the Christ. Unless the Gospel comes from outside, he cannot free himself.

So the Gospel is a *necessary* pre-condition for man's return to the freedom of fulfillment; it opens up to man a new possibility, one which he did not know before. But it is not a *sufficient* condition; man himself must turn toward the God of love and accept the forgiveness offered. Man is confronted with the two possibilities, faith and offense. He must choose. "He can and should believe, that is, turn away from his false freedom and return to union with God."³³

To summarize: The problem of determinism/free will is a different problem from that of religious bondage/freedom, though they are related. It is necessary to assert free will, within its limiting conditions, before any sense can be made of the second problem. Only by the use of free will can a responsible step be made from the bondage of the will to the freedom of fulfillment, but this step can only be made if a new possibility has opened up by the hearing of the Gospel.

32 Brunner, *op. cit.*, p. 265.

33 *Ibid.*, p. 274.

Being, Selfhood, and Presence

BY JOHN E. SKINNER

ONE of the basic problems in contemporary theology centers in the category which most adequately expresses the ultimate or the unconditional in the language of philosophy and the living or personal God in the vocabulary of the Bible. At first glance, depending upon the frame of reference represented, the problem may be solved either by an affirmation of the ontological category of being-itself or by the acceptance of the dramatic imagery of the Bible as it is derived from personal encounter between selves, i.e. in selfhood and living faith.

Paul Tillich, of Harvard University, is a representative of the former position, and he asserts that God is, first of all, being as such. In Tillich's theology being is not the most abstract category of thought, but rather his category for ultimacy is the power of being in everything that is, in everything that participates in being.¹ Being comprises mystical, vital, personal, and cognitive elements, and it transcends the subjective-objective antithesis. It possesses a depth which penetrates far beyond any nominalistic abstraction.

Richard Kroner, of Temple University, and Reinhold Niebuhr, of Union Theological Seminary in New York, represent the latter perspective. Both Kroner and Niebuhr see the dramatic elements in the Bible—imagery which points to the living God or the personal God—as ultimate. Niebuhr speaks about the dialogue of the self with itself, with other selves, and with God; Kroner confers ultimacy upon the divine mystery which can only be articulated by religious imagination.²

Tillich answers his two former colleagues by including the personal dimension in being. Being includes personal being, as the ground of being is the ground of personal being. He states: "This means that our encounter with the God who is a person includes the encounter

1 Paul Tillich, *The Protestant Era*, translated by James Luther Adams (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1948), p. 63.

2 See Reinhold Niebuhr, *The Self and the Dramas of History* (New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1955); and Richard Kroner, *The Religious Function of Imagination* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1941).

with the God who is the ground of everything personal and as such is not a person."³

I

Several possibilities develop from this analysis. The ontological quest for being and the dramatic character of the Bible can be contradistinguished in the sense that being itself becomes only an idol, or an abstraction, or an objectification of the revelation of the living God in the Bible. In such a view the ontological quest is judged as a pretension of sinful man and dismissed. So-called kerygmatic theology (for example, the Barthians) denies the philosopher's ultimate category for this reason. At the same time the quest for being can be affirmed as the highest expression of man's task, and the revelatory truths of the Bible can be relegated to mythology, or treated as anthropomorphic distortions which the ontologist must purify through the fires of rational discourse. So-called revelatory truth is inferior to the ultimate category of the speculative reason. Such ontologism is almost extinct today due to the influence of logical positivism and related disciplines in philosophic circles.

Tillich and Kroner (also Niebuhr) would not identify themselves with either of these extremes. Tillich, in his affirmation of the ontological category of being-itself, posits the necessity for revelation in the mediation of ultimate reality to the non-ultimate. At this point he reflects his Lutheran heritage. *Finitum capax infiniti!* Through religious symbol the reality of being-itself is mediated. The finite is capable of the infinite. In contrast to this, the kerygmatic theologian would adopt the Zwinglian *finitum non capax infiniti*.

Kroner would also affirm that the finite is capable of the infinite, but with the following modifications. In his theory of the religious imagination, the sense-data and the cognitive form must be synthesized in such a way that the one is not subordinate to the other. Imagination does this since it can grasp totalities; thought can never arrive at a totality through its function. Through what Kroner calls inspired imagination⁴ an image of the ultimate is achieved (a totality constituted

3 Paul Tillich, *Biblical Religion and the Search for Ultimate Reality* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1955), p. 83.

4 Kroner, *op. cit.*, p. 37.

by both universality and individuality, but articulated in an image such as Creator, Father, etc.). Kroner considers this kind of image as the only ultimate accessible to man. Kroner's image is similar to Tillich's symbol, but he believes that the universal element is adequately included in the image of the totality. Tillich feels, however, that it must be expressed by the ontological category, being-itself. Thus Tillich attempts to correlate the speculative and the revelatory, the ontological and the dramatic, with the primacy centered in the ontological; Kroner and Niebuhr respect the rational structure which is furnished by the ontological or speculative, but place the primacy in the dramatic or the revelatory.

Tillich's system endangers the personal dimension. Niebuhr is sensitive to this and has criticized the Harvard theologian severely for his ontologism. The danger can be observed in the relation of historical drama to the ground of being. The tendency, according to Niebuhr, is not only to swallow up the personal, but also to do injustice to the biblical emphasis upon history and man's freedom of action within history.⁵ Yet when Kroner and Niebuhr identify the ultimate with the personal dimension, God becomes *a* being among other beings and ceases to embrace the universality which must be a part of the ultimate.

No more discussion is necessary to convey the profundity of this problem. It may be summed up as follows: Tillich, in his embrace of the ontological category of being-itself, tends to exaggerate the universal character of ultimacy; Niebuhr and Kroner, on the other hand, exalt individuality and minimize the universality of the ultimate. These theologians are aware of this, and they attempt to resolve the difficulty either by saying that being is the ground of everything personal, or by asserting that the living God includes the universality which the ontologist finds only in a category of thought.

An antinomy results from these two points of view. Both positions are necessary; both must be affirmed. In the affirmation of the one, however, the other is negated. Being tends to deny or absorb the self element; selfhood tends to eliminate the necessary truth that being represents. Can there be any solution to this impasse? Is there any category which includes within itself the universality of being with its

5 Niebuhr, *op. cit.*, p. 76.

mystical and vital elements (Tillich) and the uniqueness of the personal dimension of selfhood with its emphasis upon the historic and the dramatic (Kroner and Niebuhr)?

II

Before attempting to answer the question concerning a category which embraces both universality and individuality without falling into the difficulties represented by being and selfhood, we must first discuss the question of Tillich's use of symbols.

Tillich has vacillated in his approach to religious symbols and their relation to the non-symbolic. In an essay in *The Protestant Era* he asserts that being is itself a symbol. He says: "When Being as a symbol was lost, Being-itself was lost."⁶ In his later reflections, however, he declares that being-itself is a wholly unsymbolic statement. Religious symbols must symbolize something non-symbolic. He modified his approach here due to the suggestion of Professor Urban, of Yale.⁷ But since great criticism was directed against this utterance, he again changed his teaching in Volume II of his *Systematic Theology* by writing: "If we say that God is the infinite, or the unconditional, or being-itself, we speak rationally and ecstatically at the same time. These terms precisely designate the boundary line at which the symbolic and the non-symbolic coincide."⁸

Tillich is faced with the dilemma of the antinomy which we discussed earlier. The only unsymbolic statement is the assertion that everything we say about God is symbolic. The symbolic and the non-symbolic must be held in a dialectical tension. Every symbol participates in the reality it mediates without exhausting that reality. The reality is mediated symbolically; the source of the reality mediated is non-symbolic; the tension arises in the relation between the two.

The reality mediated by religious symbols makes possible a personal encounter, a meeting between man and God. The symbolic is the basis for the historical dramas of the Bible in Tillich's analysis. The problems of freedom, individuality, selfhood, etc., must be faced there.

6 Tillich, p. 64.

7 See Tillich, "Reply to Interpretation and Criticism," in *The Library of Living Theology*, edited by C. W. Kegley and R. W. Bretall (New York: Macmillan, 1952), p. 334; also Tillich, *Systematic Theology* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1951), I, 239.

8 Tillich, *Systematic Theology*, II, 10.

The non-symbolic, or the ground of everything personal and dramatic, is that reality not exhausted by the participating symbols.

For example, Tillich asserts that to the extent to which Protestantism neglected the non-personal elements in man (his vital and mystical side) for the sake of consciousness, God was transformed from the transcending center of every personal life (i.e. the ground of everything personal) into an autonomous personality beside the others. As a result, he declares, "The persons were left alone, centered in themselves and very soon unable to stand the situation of monadic loneliness. . . . When God became a person, man's personality was driven into neurotic disintegration."⁹

The tension between the symbolic and the non-symbolic, or between symbols which make possible the divine-human encounter and the non-symbolic whose reality they do not exhaust (i.e. being-itself), must be maintained.¹⁰

So it is not too difficult to understand why Tillich has found such a category as being-itself not wholly satisfactory, as evidenced by his modifications, and his final word thus far on the subject is the affirmation of a tension between the two poles. Yet is there not a more adequate category than being-itself to express what needs to be conserved, i.e. a transcendent ground for everything personal?

III

The first step which we must take in the attempt to find a solution to this impasse is the necessary affirmation that any category of ultimacy must include within itself both the element of universality and also the element of individuality. Philosophers and theologians have attempted for centuries to classify the ultimate in terms of the universal. If the history of religious thought proves anything, it demon-

9 Tillich, *The Protestant Era*, p. 63.

10 See William Hordern, "Theology in Prospect," in *The Journal of Bible and Religion*, Vol. XXVIII, No. 2 (April, 1960), pp. 225-226, for a similar discussion of Tillich's problem with the symbolic and non-symbolic character of being-itself. This paper was written before I discovered Dr. Hordern's article. Hordern, however, is very critical of Tillich because he has not found a satisfactory non-symbolic statement for God. Hordern suggests the expression "God is personal." This statement is itself symbolic or analogical, if we take seriously the discussion of G. F. Woods in *Theological Explanation* (Nisbet, 1958). Hordern seems to misunderstand Tillich at this point, and also is very weak in regard to what he thinks a non-symbolic statement might be. In all fairness, however, Hordern did not develop this thesis, as his article was not exclusively devoted to this problem.

strates the futility of such reflection. The ultimate can never be known as it is in itself. It can only be known as it relates to that which is not ultimate, and the point of departure for seeking an ultimate category must be man, and not the ultimate-in-itself.

I think that this was Tillich's difficulty when he equated being-itself wholly with the non-symbolic. He was attempting to grasp ultimacy-in-itself. It is this error which he partially corrects when he asserts both the symbolic and the non-symbolic character of being-itself.

This was also the problem faced by the theologians of the early church when they wrestled with ultimacy, and it seems to me that some form of modalism is the most satisfactory solution to the problem they faced, since modalism starts with the ultimate in relation to man (i.e. God in his self-disclosure) and refuses to answer the question of what God is in himself. The affirmation, however, of the universal element in the ultimate comes with the insistence that a true relation exists between the ultimate-in-itself and the ultimate-in-relation.

The religious philosophy of Richard Kroner helps to clarify this. Kroner uses the expression "mystical totality" for the ultimate or universal. Through revelation the mystical totality is articulated redemptively as a solution to man's moral problem. At the point of redemptive articulation the mystical totality appears as God the Redeemer (individuality), who reveals himself also as God the Creator (universality). For Kroner the dramatic symbols, Creator and Redeemer, stand for ultimacy.

From Kroner's point of view, then, the undifferentiated mystical totality is articulated redemptively, first through the Law, which makes God's holiness not only mystical but also moral, and finally through the Law's unique fulfillment in Jesus as the Christ. Both through the Law and through its fulfillment in Jesus as the Christ the mystical totality is transformed into an image of God as Creator and Father. This led the church to make the Christ the fulfillment of the Law, i.e. the Lawgiver; this also led the author of the Fourth Gospel to make the Christ (among other things) the pre-existent Logos, in a sense equivalent to the pre-existent Torah of Judaism. The Holy Spirit carries on the fulfilled redemptive work of the Christ in history.

Obviously this is a solution to the problem which places the primacy upon the dramatic or symbolic rather than upon the ontologic. But this must be done since the ultimate can never be known in itself and must

be approached through the dramatic symbols which reveal the ultimate to man. The primacy of the Bible over ontology must be affirmed because of this.

Certain insights of the Jewish philosopher, Martin Buber, are invaluable at this point. In *I and Thou* he states that the more I approach other men as Thou, and not It, the more do they become something unique and defy objective classification. They become persons. In this respect the body of an individual person becomes a symbol for that person. It mediates the presence of that person's reality to me, participates in that reality, but does not exhaust in any way the reality of the person whose presence it mediates. It is Buber's contention, supported also by Tillich in his essay, "The Idea and Ideal of Personality,"¹¹ that the more I am confronted by the uniqueness of this personal dimension, the more do I accept other persons as Thou and, in an almost miraculous manner, I begin to approach the world around me (nature) also as a Thou. The more I am reconciled to other persons, the more I can achieve a sensitivity to the wonder of the world in which I live. The world no longer appears as an objective possibility for my exploitation but becomes a potentiality of mediating to me a presence through itself.¹²

Tillich calls this "the power of being" which comes from the new being, Jesus as the Christ. The presupposition, however, of such a relation to nature must center in the redemptive articulation of the mystical totality (Kroner) which solves the moral problem of man and allows him to treat not only other men as Thou but also the world in which he lives.

What, then, is the category which includes both the element of universality and the element of individuality but does not fall into the difficulties which we have discussed? "Presence" appears as a possible

11 Tillich, *The Protestant Era*, pp. 115-135.

12 See Basil Willey, *The Seventeenth Century Background* (Garden City: Doubleday and Company, 1953), pp. 92-97. Here Willey discusses T. S. Eliot's famous phrase "the dissociation of sensibility" in regard to the Cartesian influence upon poetry. "Instead of being able, like Donne or Browne, to think and feel simultaneously, either in verse or in prose, you were now expected to think prosaically and to feel poetically" (p. 93). Basically, Buber, Tillich, and also Kroner desire to achieve a new synthesis which will correct this error derived from Cartesian dualism. As we have seen, Kroner posits the "imagination" as a solution, which means (among other things) the affirmation of poetry as a medium of truth rather than a mere conveyor of pleasure addressed to the fancy. Although Willey's discussion is about a "proximate" rather than about the ultimate, still the solution of the problem of the "dissociation of the sensibility" will contribute to a similar view of the ultimate.

solution to the impasse.¹³ Presence is a category which is found in the Bible, and this is derivative from the pole of the dramatic and the symbolic. Yet presence is not a symbol itself, but rather it is the reality which is mediated by all religious symbols. In this respect presence includes both the universal and the individual, the ontological and the dramatic.

Traditionally, presence has been conceived as an attribute of God in systematic theology. This attribute is universalized by adding the prefix "omni" in order to arrive at the omnipresence of the divine. Accompanying this attribute are others, such as omnipotence, omniscience, etc.

When I universalize such a category as presence, I tend to intellectualize or to objectify the reality through too much emphasis upon the rational structure. The attribute becomes one of many "limits" of thought rather than the reality actually mediated to man under the conditions of existence. In the attempt to universalize, the dramatic element is transformed into an abstract concept and the living reality is lost. In one of an almost infinite number of ways that presence may be lost, the abstract category of universality swallows up the individuality or the living reality of presence. Omnipresence, as a category, is unacceptable because of this, although it does point to one element in the ultimate which is necessary, the universal element.

How, then, does the category of presence avoid this difficulty? If omnipresence bows to the universal, is not presence a capitulation to the individual? Since the ultimate must be approached from the standpoint of the non-ultimate, individuality is the point of departure. Presence, then, is a category of relation, i.e. the ultimate in relation to the non-ultimate. But presence is also the reality of the ultimate mediated through revelatory symbols. The possibility for such an

13 The source for this expression is biblical. See *The Theological Word of the Bible*, edited by Alan Richardson (New York: Macmillan, 1959), pp. 172-176. Martin Buber in his book *I and Thou*, translated by Ronald Gregor Smith (New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1955), uses this category many times, and it can be found in the writings of the great Christian mystics. Louis Lavelle, in *La Présence Totale* (Paris: Editions Montaigne, 1934), is one of the first philosophers to develop this category at length and perhaps he is the most profound of them all. An excellent discussion of "presence" can be found in a book by Ralph Harper, *The Sleeping Beauty* (New York: Harper and Brothers, 1955). Harper has special regard for the way Gabriel Marcel uses the expression; however, Harper pictures "presence" imaginatively by a fascinating adaptation of the story of the Sleeping Beauty to man's search for presence in the twentieth century.

ultimate category as presence rests in the affirmation that what a symbol mediates, although not exhausting the reality it mediates, nevertheless participates in the reality, and conveys within the limits of its function as a symbol the reality of the ultimate itself. This is the universal which becomes individual in its mediation through symbols. The necessary connection between the source of the reality mediated and the mediated reality can only be affirmed through the reality which is mediated.

This is undoubtedly one reason for Martin Luther's strange doctrine of the ubiquity of Christ's body.¹⁴ The universality of the ultimate's presence is guaranteed by the ubiquity of Christ the Mediator. The undifferentiated mystical totality can be approached only through a redemptive articulation, first in the Law and later as it is uniquely fulfilled in Jesus as the Christ. This is the identification of God as he reveals himself to man (individuality) with the mystical totality (universality). On this basis the presence of the ultimate is mediated through the Christ, who is the ultimate-in-relation. This is why Kroner speaks of the Christ as the "concrete universal" dramatically articulated.

Being-itself is the ontological equivalent and at the same time the ontological objectification of the category of presence. Tillich's expression "the power of being" is without question identical with the redemptive power of presence. Being-itself is the attempt to arrive at presence-in-itself, but the futility of this has already been shown.

The category of presence conserves what Tillich rightly insists upon, i.e. the necessity for a category which includes mystical and vital as well as personal elements. Perhaps no greater witness from the mystical side can be found than Meister Eckhart, who himself seems to convey the spirit of this solution to the impasse. In his sermon, "The Kingdom of God Is at Hand," he writes:

God is nearer to me than I am to myself. My being depends on God's intimate presence. So, too, he is near to a stick or a stone but they do not know it. . . . For

14 Luther's doctrine is intimately connected with his discussion of the "real presence" in the sacrament. This is seen especially in his dispute with Zwingli at the Marburg Colloquy in 1529. The possibility of presence being mediated through sacramental event rests upon the fullness of Christ's presence as the mediator between the ultimate and the non-ultimate. The reality of the ultimate under the conditions of existence is possible because of this—thus Luther affirms the *finitum capax infiniti*! Zwingli's position, on the other hand, which placed the ascended Christ in heaven, remote from the world, makes presence impossible under the conditions of existence. The Zwinglian *finitum non capax infiniti* is the theological counterpart of the Cartesian dualism in modern philosophy.

that reason a person may be more blessed than a stick, in that he recognizes God and knows how near he is. And the more he knows it, the more blessed he is; the less he knows it, the less his blessing.¹⁵

At the same time the category of presence conserves the integrity of the person, his individuality and his selfhood. Søren Kierkegaard has grasped the importance of a transcendent ground as the possibility for realizing truly one's selfhood. He declares: "By relating itself to its own self, and by willing to be itself, the self is grounded transparently in the Power which constituted it."¹⁶ The power which Kierkegaard speaks about is the power of presence, since S. K. preferred the biblical and dramatic categories to the ontological, and the presupposition of being grounded transparently is centered in the willingness of the self to be itself. This is another way of expressing the necessity of repentance as a prerequisite for being grounded in the power of redemptive presence.

One other question may be asked concerning presence as a category for the ultimate. Presence of what? This question, of course, is unanswerable, since the answer would presume a knowledge of what the ultimate is in itself. It would again force the theologian into the task of comprehending universality, and this has been demonstrated as impossible.

Some help relative to this question can be found in the thought of Rudolf Otto and Nicholas Berdyaev. What Otto calls the numinous or the *mysterium tremendum* in his famous book *The Idea of the Holy*, or what Berdyaev has called spirit, freedom, and creativity in many of his works, approaches the same meaning intended in the category of presence. The presence of the numinous, or of the mystery of creative freedom, or for that matter of "God" are all possibilities. The early Fathers spoke of the divine silence, which was broken by the *logos* (*logos aposiges*)—the word which breaks the silence of eternity; this is comparable to what Kroner means by the redemptive articulation of the undifferentiated mystical totality.

In the Bible we are confronted with the refusal of the Hebrews to utter the name of God, the sacred *Tetragrammaton*. This is a witness

15 Eckhart's *Sermons*, translated by R. B. Blakney (New York: Harper and Brothers, 1941), p. 129.

16 Søren Kierkegaard, *The Sickness Unto Death*, translated by Walter Lowrie (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1946), p. 216.

to the mystery of the divine presence. The "real presence" of Christ in the Holy Supper is shrouded in similar mystery (or should be) and is also an anticipation of the fullness of his presence when he comes again. The consummation of all things in the *parousia* is especially suggestive since the correct translation of this word is presence. The final solution to the ontologist's quest for the ultimate rests in the hope that in the *eschaton* all creation will be reconciled to the ultimate through the redemptive power of the ultimate's presence in Jesus as the Christ.

In conclusion, the category of presence conserves what Tillich wants to protect in his concept of being-itself, i.e. the ground for everything personal, but it also affirms the primacy of the personal dimension and protects the uniqueness of personality from being swallowed up in an ontological category. If the key to presence is the redemptive power of Jesus as the Christ, then person is reconciled to person, to nature, and to the ultimate without being sacrificed to an undifferentiated universality.

Reflections on Happiness

BY G. R. WEBBER

THE word "happiness" does not occur in the King James translation of our Scriptures. There seems to be no word in either Testament which appealed to the translators as a true expression of the state of being which we call "happiness." We find "happy," "haply," "happen," all from "hap," meaning "chance," though these occur infrequently in comparison with the usage of "joy," "gladness," "good cheer." For that matter "happiness" is a rare word in contemporary works on psychology.

If we go back five centuries before the New Testament, we find a wealth of material concerning happiness. Plato and Aristotle gave considerable attention to it. The Greek thinker, ever a layman, felt no inhibition in treating it in the abstract nor in commending it as the greatest reward of all. The common man was not given a carte blanche benediction on his variety of it. Instead the scholar's variety was the alternative of an abounding hedonism of the period. The Hebrew, priestly by nature, had no objection to an Israelite being a happy creature but insisted that fullness of joy be reserved for God's revealed interests.

Going back three more centuries we find Hesiod lamenting that the Iron Age was wickedly venal. He attributed it in part to the coinage of money which came into the possession of the common man. In consequence the ruling class, wealthy and aristocratic by birth, was overthrown. Everyone lusted for this new power and vainglory; moral ideals and religious sanctions failed. There were sensualistic and hedonistic teachers in China in the seventh century, and in the Greek world by the time of the greater philosophers. Before this time not a few of the hymn writers of India had become virtual atheists.

The Buddha, as most of the greater wise men of the age, was a reformer. Pythagoras set up a monastery for the youth. Confucius was a moral reformer. The Buddha, a prince, left his royal surroundings to deliver his people from the millennium-long penalties of reincarnation by crucifying desire. By utterly crucifying desire the elect entered

Nirvana at death and were spared the endless ordeals of reincarnation. The monks who in the solitudes of the forests attained the extinction of desire were left empty shells, someone has observed, and suicides of the soul.

In Brahmanism the Brahma was the Shining One, the *tat tvam asi* (that art thou), the inflowing spirit that is thought and wish. When the wise man after years of contemplation in solitude recognizes the Brahma as the self, he leaves joy and sorrow and possesses eternal peace. This philosophy has been called a branch of Buddhism. We cannot escape notice of its reflection in the hedonism of Epicurus, whose elect lived apart from society in *ataraxia*, a vine-and-fig-tree leisure. At the end of their days Nature provided the elect with a perpetual anesthesia.

Deliverance was the dominant promise of religions and philosophies the world over. The sensualists and hedonists defended pleasure. In a middle ground the greater Greek philosophers offered happiness. As hedonism was an improved version of sensualism, calling for some little moral piety as insurance against painful regret, happiness was a refined version of hedonism. It was hedonistic in the sense that it was offered as the end beyond which there was nothing desirable. It had all the marks of "I show unto you a more excellent way." The world is too much with you; getting and spending lays waste your powers. Why settle for *Hedone* when you may have happiness?

Should we expect to find in inspired Hebrew writing a chapter on the nature of happiness? The newest approach might be Ecclesiastes, but he calls it vanity of vanities. Lofty though the Greek version may be, it is far from the bread of heaven. Nehemiah and Ezra are not adverse to happiness at its proper level, but Nehemiah says (8:10), "The joy of the Lord is your strength."

The happiness of natural man is mainly a matter of pleasure. It is earthy and threatens to lead him into a life of sensualism. The happiness of the better citizen is an improvement, but impotent beyond temporal interests. The liberal arts version is ornate, but it, too, is of this life and has no promise of the life to come. We cannot escape pleasure of sense nor pleasure of mind at these levels. At the biological level sense pleasure is not optional, nor is the pleasure of mind associated with it. Happiness at these levels is not, nor may it be, condemned utterly by our Scriptures. What our inspired authors require

is a moderate enjoyment of such happiness and the whole being given to loving the Lord God.

It is well to know more about happiness than the average ap-perceptive mass affords. It plays an important role in every life and in the whole society. To know but a few of the fundamental insights of the philosophers is better than depending on casual observation and experience. To know all that they have said about it involves many hours of reading and study. What the average popular communist says about it is hardly dimensional.

First, let us note that there is such a thing. Efforts are made from time to time to dismiss it as an overtone of the emotions, or feelings. We do not offer rebuttal to the observation that the Pollyanna goes along rejoicing in life. The street urchin is proverbially happy, and the simple-minded. But this is only one of its facets. It can be a childish affair, as when one's mood becomes lyrical for hours at the prospect of a pleasure to be. There are other facets. In the *Rhetorica* (I, 1361a, Jebb) Aristotle lists ten supports or resources of happiness: good birth, good family, good reputation, wealth, honor, happy old age, friendship, fortune, virtue. The list requires modernization and additions but serves our present purpose. Each of the resources has dividends on which their possessor may draw at all times; the effect involves the whole being in enjoyment, evoking appreciation, gratitude, satisfaction. The reaction is a well-defined experience.

Let us also note that happiness, as Aristotle observed, has a nature of its own. It is not mirth at one time, nor merriment at another; it is not merely a *motus vitae*, as in transient pleasures of mind. It rather is a state of the whole being, a condition that remains for an hour, a day, or longer. It has its own attributes, one or more of which appear in every repetition. A happy person is free, in a good humor, sees life through rose-colored glasses, performs his work well, looks ahead with confidence. He is in a condition which suggests that a benign spirit has possessed his whole being and, as the Brahma, directs his thoughts and wishes.

When it comes to an analysis of pleasure at its physical level, we are hard put for facts. Occasionally a courageous individual reads a paper before an elite gathering on the nature of sensation; he talks over our heads about ions and cations, makes an AP box in the morning press, but his labor, as that of the singer in *Old Man River*, is

soon forgotten. The street urchin, knowing nothing about the contents of the erudite lecture, enjoys sense pleasures as keenly as the author of the lecture. Sense pleasure may be the germ idea of happiness, as some have proposed. One's first experiences are pleasure and pain; reactions are spontaneous and reflexive. We experience and enjoy sense pleasure and pleasure of mind first, and apply intuitive reasoning in maturity. As we leave the biological level and meet needs in the social, economic, esthetic, intellectual, and spiritual realms, pleasure of mind matures and evolves into mature happiness.

As happiness is refined and matured we learn the joy of thinking, reflecting, anticipating, and recalling. We do not become so cultured by liberal arts courses but that thoughts of a well-stocked food locker and groaning Thanksgiving table disperse thoughts of insecurity. At the table the heart is warm toward all others, surrounding it with many a jocund laugh and glad hail. At other times thoughts of one's loyal friends, who in spite of our faults are for us, dispel agitating emotions into a day of equanimity. Yes, it is the best of all possible worlds. At other times a spirit bears witness with our spirit that we are the fair-haired sons of fortune. A yet higher order of happiness, but one to which the present era lends slight encouragement, reflects on high ideals and contemplates sterling values.

Professor Pitkin has somewhere proposed that happiness is the chief unifying factor of the self. This view is in harmony with the postulate of Aristotle that happiness is the end beyond all ends. It is the pot of gold beyond the rainbow, the pearl of great price. The recently engaged girl is happy about finding the man who wants her most, about her ring, and about a more realistic plan for the wedding gown, but beyond these is the enduring satisfaction that she will be Mrs. So and So. We lust for wealth partly because, as Theognis observed, we can do so many things with money, partly for reasons of security, but beyond these is the more exciting consideration of being rich and recognized. The anticipation of these satisfactions marshals the ambitions, initiative, resolutions into action and cracks the whip until completion.

It must be said for the commoner form of happiness that it partly renounces the milk-fat paradise of infancy and partly overcomes the world that is with the ordinary adult late and soon. Composure and equanimity are not free gifts in the nature of toy balloons on dollar

day. To make oneself comfortable in this world of thorns and thistles is not in a category with the sun that shines on the just and unjust. Yet more effort is required of those who would enjoy the fruits of a liberal arts ideal satisfaction with life. The disciples of this ornate way attain what an ancient Chinese savant called "applause of one's conscience." Confucius noted in the *Analects* (II, iv, 6) that at seventy he enjoyed what his heart desired with no transgression on whatever was right.

Notwithstanding these ornate tenets we never quite rise above linking happiness with Utopia. A world-wide organization in our times holds that prize before us in return for political allegiance. We do not sign a contract with the party, but we do purchase glamour stocks for which rumor or an enthusiastic analyst predicts the space rocket career of Thiokol and IBM. We are not satisfied with a day-long physical equilibrium in conjunction with a psychical truce, not a week-long calm, but crave the luxuries of the neighbor who hit the jack pot in the potato chip field, well aware that his stock of happiness is slender.

Even though our inspired authors afford no treatise on the nature of happiness, they do meet the fact of its presence as a condition that confronted them and afford a revealed concept of true joy. The Epistle appointed for the fourth Sunday in Advent, Phil. 4:4-7, is a notable example. In addition to its richness of content and sonorous form for reading from the lectern, it strikes a responsive chord by its first words, an appeal to one's sense of happiness. "Rejoice in the Lord alway." Do not be unhappy about your unhappiness, the preface seems to say, for you can be happy. How? Take your problems and reverses to God with supplication and thanksgiving and "the peace of God which passeth understanding shall keep your hearts and minds in Christ Jesus." One essence of happiness is peace, or a trace in which the mind is free to dwell on the sunny side of life. Another essence is rejoicing in one's good fortune.

It would hardly be a healthy happiness if it were altogether subjective. Paul therefore gives his readers a formula for an objective relief: "whatsoever things are true, whatsoever things are honest, whatsoever things are just, whatsoever things are pure, whatsoever things are lovely, whatsoever things are of good report; if there be any virtue, if there be any praise, think on these things." As service on behalf of others is advised as a remedy for unhappiness, Paul would add health

to the mind by giving serious thought to matters outside one's own secular treasures. After this section there follows one that is headed in one Bible by "Victory Over Anxious Care" and that contains a royal secret for happiness. Paul has learned in whatsoever state he is therewith to be content. Someone has recently defined happiness as "satisfaction with life." This definition does not bring the whole thing together, but it does state a *conditio sine qua non*. Paul is instructed both to be full and to be hungry, to abound and to suffer need, but he is supported by the promise that he can do all things by the strength of the Christ. "The joy of the Lord," says Nehemiah (8:10), "is your strength."

Joy in one's God is mentioned elsewhere, as in the familiar Psalm 51, as though a believer were without a satisfying happiness if it were not divinely centered. "Make me to hear joy and gladness," David petitions in his distress, "that the bones which thou hast broken may rejoice" (8), and "restore unto me the joy of thy salvation" (12). Paul closes one of the sections of his letter to the Romans with a benediction heard somewhat frequently in the past decade (15:13), "Now the God of hope fill you with all joy and peace in believing, that ye may abound in hope, through the power of the Holy Ghost." Jerusalem and Mount Zion and its temple are mentioned by Hebrew writers as sources of happiness. The captives wept by the rivers of Babylon when they remembered Zion, and hanged their harps on willows. Their captors required of them a song and wasted them by requiring mirth. How may an Israelite sing the Lord's song in a strange land? No, let him be struck dumb if he prefer not Jerusalem above his chief joy (Ps. 137:1-6).

Paul was a little more explicit than the evangelists in naming the attributes of happiness, such as hope, joy, and peace in belief, but the Gospels speak frequently of it. It is clearly implied in the parable of the talents (Matt. 25:14-30). The five- and ten-talent characters were commended, promoted, and bidden to enter the joy of their lord. In John 15:11 Jesus said to his apostles: "These things have I spoken unto you, that my joy might remain in you, and that your joy might be full." In Matt. 5:12 he enjoined his hearers to rejoice and be exceeding glad, for great are the rewards of heaven, and in Luke's account (6:23) those persecuted for his name's sake were to rejoice and leap for joy. In our Scriptures joy is a more active, continuous, fruitful,

and dimensional happiness than that offered by the Greek philosophers in their ornate craftsmanship.

Common to both is personal possession. Rewards in heaven are such. There is possession and benefit implied in Jesus' comfort (John 16:33), "Be of good cheer, I have overcome the world." Our Scriptures do not operate in a vacuum of human interest. The human is a creature of need and needs satisfaction. There is no need-fulfillment without satisfaction. However, the human, unlike the animal, is appreciative and sensible of his benefits and grateful, and these raise happiness above the delight of a colt in his legs. In the Scriptures the end is for itself and not for satisfaction alone. Happiness is a witness.

The Israelite was happy about the temple and the feasts, its worship and song, about such virtues as meekness and wisdom, about righteousness, the law, and salvation, and was happy in their possession and promises. This was an indication of a healthy attitude toward them, the luster and glow of a norm. Paul lists joy as a fruit of the spirit (Gal. 5:22). He prayed for the saints in Philippi with joy (Phil. 1:4). The Scriptures reinforce our surmise that happiness is sense of a total well-being of the whole creature. The whole being is at its best and nearest the creature that God made.

We have said nothing of the beatitudes and must not bypass them. We like the "blesseds" in the King James more than the "happy" of other renderings, though these others excel on many a page. "Happy" does not seriously mar the content and yet fails to offer the sense of a benediction. The natural man can be happy without being poor in spirit, merciful, pure in heart, but he cannot be blessed. The virtues and graces of the person born again, who is "more than the man" by their possession, have the benediction of God, and such may well be happy about them in good conscience, though these are more vital than happiness. And those born again rejoice in tribulation on account of them.

We have long been taught in sententious sayings that good conduct is the key that opens the treasury of happiness. It would be a narrow happiness if we were empty-handed except for circumspect behavior. We much prefer to regard happiness as coextensive with the infinite variety of creation, in the familiar thought of Plato, and to conceive happiness as being as broad and deep as the individual is creative. If that be true, we are again faced with the problem noted in the beginning of this sketch, the enclosing of happiness in a definition.

A Theological Critique of Lutheran Worship

BY WILLIAM C. BERKEMEYER

THE liturgical movement of our times is a sign of our increasing interest in common worship. But in the Lutheran Churches of America there seems to have been more interest in the horizontal aspects than in the vertical. We have reviewed history to reconsider our present rites and practices. But we have given much less thought to the theology of worship. We have not asked rigorously enough, "Do our forms faithfully bear the Gospel to our age?" It cannot be so easily assumed that the words and acts and patterns which once served with fair faithfulness speak the same language to our day.

We need increasing sensitiveness to a liturgical semantics which deals with the words and music and rites and ceremonies and thought patterns in the related context of Christian worship. In theological areas, generally, we have become more conscious of the need to translate the continuing tradition of the Christian insights of the past into the vocabulary and thought patterns of our day so that modern men may actually be confronted with the God of the Gospel, the revelation of Christ and the cross. We have recognized that to do this we must not only put "the new wine" of the Gospel in new wine-skins before the old ones burst and the wine is lost, but also find ways of developing in our secular generation a thirst for the wine of the Gospel. This applies as much to liturgy as to doctrine and preaching and the practical life of the church. Does our present liturgy do this?

THE FOCUS OF THE LITURGY

To whom is our present liturgy directed? For what group of worshipers is it intended? Who are served? Obviously not the secularists of our world but the existing church, the family presently gathered for worship. But does it envision the present church realistically? The whole of the liturgy has become the mass of the faithful, and perhaps only a small segment of these. In this realization voices are heard calling for other types of "orders of worship," of a more informal or evangelistic

type, directed at the world. We have had some experimentation, none too successful. There is a basic reason for this. It is not only the men of the world who enter the church from a secular background at the hour of worship, but the men of the church, too, even "the faithful."

The people who might be found in a sanctuary at the time for common worship might be categorized roughly as follows: (1) A few secularists may be there because they were badgered into coming by a neighbor or because their present world has suddenly come apart. (2) Young people may be there who have never received systematic, thorough instruction in the mature meaning of the faith. (3) The traditional "outer circle" of the church will have its representatives, the non-communing, non-contributing, non-active superficialists. (4) The "regulars" who are theologically naive will be well represented. (5) The traditionalists will be there, those who enjoy the old, familiar patterns, whether they are understood or no. (6) Finally there will be a sensitive inner circle, people who because of the depth and reality of their Christian experience can take hold of any form and use it to worship God.

Upon which group should the common liturgy be focused? Certainly not upon the "sensitive," for they can and will use with profit any liturgy which serves the rest; nor upon the "traditionalists," for though they will be most readily offended, they will be most certainly served by any liturgy that is upsetting and stimulating. The other four groups are really all variants of one type. They are all "secularist" as they come to worship, whether from within or without the church.

THE INITIAL PURPOSE OF THE LITURGY

To enable a genuine experience of Christian worship to take place, the liturgy must do two things, and do them immediately. It must transport men into a totally different world—one in which the God of Jesus Christ is the center. It must enable them to hear this God speak to them "in their own tongue." If it does these things, it will serve every man of whatever category.

Obviously this cannot be realized by one avenue alone. All the senses must be touched—eye, ear, taste, touch, smell. Men must be confronted with the God of Jesus Christ in the art and architecture of the church, in the melody and harmony and rhythm of music and

poetry and responsive speech, in the verbalism of the sermon and the dramatic symbolism of the sacraments.

How does our present liturgical practice fit into this spiritual need of modern man? This is a question which the church dare never stop asking, however aesthetically lovely or historically traditional or personally satisfying its newest liturgies are. For change is characteristic of living. The only life that lasts is the life that changes its form to meet the changing environment.

My special concern when I ask this question centers about two traditional ideas and practices which need reconsideration. I believe these have a close relationship in our modern worship. I want to begin with the more external one.

THE PLACEMENT OF THE CONFESSION OF SINS

There is no need to belabor a point which is surely evident to all pastors, i.e. that worshipers do not come to the sanctuary at the hour of worship with a strong sense of sin. The secular world from which they come, be they church members or not, does not make men conscious of the holy presence of God in life, and even less of his will and nature as revealed in Christ. If men are to have a deeply personal and real sense of sin, the hour of worship itself must call it forth. It is utterly unrealistic to begin the liturgy with the Confession of Sins, as though men came vividly imbued with this consciousness, needing only a proper vehicle for expressing it. On the contrary, what men need is to be so truly confronted with God that they will feel they are sinners and will desire forgiveness and renewal. Only God can do this.

The worship of the church needs to begin with such a clear, vivid, faithful, powerful epiphany of God and his nature as will cause the secular man to say with Peter: "Depart from me, for I am a sinful man, O Lord."

It will certainly call for all of the best and most creative work of the church—its artists, architects, musicians, theologians, preachers, pastors—to make the first moment of worship in the church so "wholly other" that the man who enters feels with Isaiah, "Holy, holy, holy is the Lord of hosts; the whole earth is filled with his glory. . . Woe is me! for I am lost; for I am a man of unclean lips; for my eyes have seen the King, the Lord of hosts" (Is. 6:3 f.). Yet what is needed

is a moment of such heat and light as will melt the worldly pattern of the worshiper and fire a desire to be remolded wholly in the image of Jesus Christ.

It is understandable that the church has failed to do this in its worship. My concern is that it has not tried with repeated and creative urgency. We seem to have assumed, at the beginning of the liturgy, that through such a bare form as the Invocation a sense of God's presence and nature in Christ would overwhelm the worshiper and call forth a genuine consciousness of sin and desire for forgiveness.

But what else can we do? What else should we do as we begin the liturgy? The otherworldliness of the art and architecture of the church building, the simplicity but genuinely communicative nature of the symbols, the nature of the musical prelude, the objective declaration of the opening hymn should all be pointed in this common direction. But this is not enough.

In private worship prayer, praise, confession, and thanksgiving are called forth by the reading of Scripture. A true preaching of the Gospel, at any time or place, brings in its wake the response of confession, both of sin and of faith. Might these precede the Confession of Sin in the liturgy? Does not the same spiritual logic direct that our prayer and praise (Kyrie, Gloria in Excelsis, Collect) need first the consciousness of the nature and presence of God? In place of the gentle, rocky rhythm of the sacramental and sacrificial elements throughout the liturgy, do we not need at the beginning a massive sacramental mountain from which can flow the rivers of sacrificial response?

THE LAW AND THE GOSPEL

The other and related concern of mine touches an old theme in Lutheran theology, the place of Law and Gospel. The Law has been placed before the Gospel in the belief that the high, holy will of God must show men their need, their helplessness, their sin—before the Gospel will be accepted with its help and healing. We have begun with what God demands, and followed with what God gives. Why? This has never worked in the world before Christ or after. This was not God's way of bringing men into a genuine consciousness of sin and understanding of his will and nature. It matters not where we open the Scriptures, the Gospel comes first. The Gospel creates the real consciousness of sin, as well as the sense of forgiveness and all the

moral power that flow from it.

In the day of the Mosaic covenant, God did not begin with the Commandments but with the gracious deliverance of the Israelites: "I am the Lord your God who brought you out of the house of bondage. . . . Thou shalt have no other Gods before me." In Jesus' own day, it was his miracles of healing, his cross of suffering, which called forth both a sense of sin and a desire for and faith in the gracious forgiveness of God. It was because God was revealed as "wholly other," not in power but in gracious, creative, suffering, forgiving love, that men responded in faith.

We should never reverse this divine order in our theology or in our liturgy. The first note that must be struck in common worship must sound the glory of the Gospel. We Lutherans have an almost pathological fear of making the Gospel into a "law." Yet what God really demands is what he has given. Not some lesser morality, but gracious, forgiving, suffering love for God and man is what God wants of his children. This is the whole Law and Gospel. God has a right to expect what he has given. When men "sin," they sin against love. When they are conscious of sin and confess it, they are confessing that they failed to love God and their fellows. When they ask for mercy, it is to the end that by God's gracious spirit they may yet be filled with his loving nature. To immerse men in this river of life is the end of Christian worship.

We must be searching constantly for new and more powerful ways of doing this. We cannot assume that the mere sight of a cross on an altar or the bare repetition of the sacrament will effect this. We cannot hope that even the most eloquent and passionate preaching of the Gospel will effect it either. Here is where the pastoral-priestly outreach of the whole church, laymen and clergy, must prepare the way for the high moment of common worship. The God of grace whose presence and nature is to be set before the worshiper as perfectly as human faithfulness can do this at the very opening of the liturgy must be no stranger. The worshiper must come in expectant faith because the believer in his vocation has "graciously" touched and served him. Then the opening note of common worship—all that is done to re-echo the God of the Gospel—will be recognized for what it is, and men will be brought to their knees in true confession of sins and to their feet in joyous prayer, praise, and thanksgiving.

Sacraments of the Word in Luther

BY WILLIAM H. LAZARETH

THERE is a great revival of interest in the sacraments among American Lutherans in our day. This is good. At the same time, often in the same circles, there is also widespread ignorance of the uniquely Lutheran understanding of the sacraments. This is not good. Consequently one of the most pressing needs in the church today is to call a halt to the unevangelical practice of treating Word and sacrament as though they were mutually exclusive, and then pitting one against the other in partisan fashion.

In actual fact, the very parallel construction of "Word and sacrament" is a rather misleading inheritance. Luther defined the Word which constitutes the church as "the gospel of God concerning Christ." The sermon and the sacraments, in turn, were then considered to be channels of this gracious Word. We, however, have become accustomed to say "Word and sacrament" when we actually mean "sermon and sacrament." For, strictly speaking, it is only the real presence of the Word which makes both the sermon the sermon and the sacrament the sacrament. Our loose usage of language tempts us to forget that all the church has to offer is the Word, whether in speech or in action. The same judging and forgiving Word is present in the preaching of the sermon as in the eating and drinking of the sacrament.

Indeed, instead of pitting one form of the Word against another, we should joyfully offer to the world both a sacramental Word and a verbal sacrament, since Christ is truly present and actually gives what he promises in the sermon and in the sacrament. To substantiate this claim, we shall briefly trace the heart of Luther's thought on the nature and benefits of the sacraments, illustrating his primary concern that the sacraments be confessed and administered solely as sacraments of the Word. In words as relevant to our day as to his own, Luther wrote:

Let us open our eyes and learn to give more heed to the Word than to the sign, and to faith than to the work, or the use of the sign, remembering that wherever there is a divine promise there faith is required, and that these two are so necessary

to each other that neither can be efficacious apart from the other. For it is not possible to believe unless there be a promise, and the promise is not established unless it is believed. But where these two meet, they give a real and most certain efficacy to the sacraments. Hence, to seek the efficacy of the sacrament apart from the promise and apart from faith, is to labor in vain and to find damnation.¹

"SACRAMENT" OF PENANCE

Luther's central views on the grace of God and the sacraments of the church reach their culmination early in his vastly influential work entitled *The Babylonian Captivity of the Church* (1520). Culling together both growing protests and constructive emphases, Luther lashes out with the devastating forthrightness of a man who realizes that he has reached the point of no return.² Rumors of heresy and excommunication have already reached his ears. Therefore, "challenged and attacked, nay, forcibly thrust into the arena, I shall freely speak my mind; let all the papists laugh or weep together."³

After he had finished three works on baptism, penance, and Holy Communion in late 1519, Luther wrote privately to Spalatin that he "should not expect from me any treatise on the other sacraments until I learn by what text I can prove that they are sacraments. I esteem none of the others a sacrament, for that is not a sacrament save what is expressly given by a divine promise exercising our faith. We can have no intercourse with God save by the Word of him promising, and by the faith of man receiving the promise. At another time you will hear more about their fables of the seven sacraments."⁴ Having gained the scriptural authority which he sought, the time soon came for Luther in this treatise to give a clear and uncompromising witness of his faith.

At the outset I must deny that there are seven sacraments, and hold for the present to but three—baptism, penance, and the bread. These three have been subjected to a miserable captivity by the Roman curia, and the church has been deprived of all her liberty. To be sure, if I desired to use the term in its scriptural sense, I would allow but a single sacrament with three sacramental signs.⁵

We shall first discuss penance because it will not remain long in

1 *Works of Martin Luther* (Philadelphia, 1915-1932), II, 229.

2 *Ibid.*, II, 293.

3 *Ibid.*, II, 178.

4 Preserved Smith, *Luther's Correspondence* (Philadelphia, 1913), I, 263.

5 *Works of Martin Luther*, II, 177.

the exclusive sacramental circle—even within this same treatise. Luther's sharpened understanding of the scriptural requirements of a sacrament enables him to strike immediately at the core of the Roman captivity "in order to unmask the tyranny that is rampant here."

This is the first and chief abuse of this sacrament [of penance]: They have utterly abolished the sacrament itself, so that there is not a vestige of it left. For they have overthrown both the Word of divine promise and our faith, in which this as well as other sacraments consists.⁶

Rome is guilty of having corrupted both grace and faith in the sacrament. For God's free grace they have substituted the church's purchasable absolution; for trusting faith they have substituted meritorious works and sacrifices. "Verily, by the rivers of Babylon we sit and weep, when we remember thee, O Zion." The Christian's plight is clear when we analyze the three parts of the sacrament as currently practiced. First, contrition is made to precede faith as the human merit of natural man, permitting even "a so-called 'attrition,' which is converted into contrition by virtue of the power of the keys, of which they know nothing."⁷ This cheap grace grants forgiveness of sins even to "the wicked and unbelieving." Luther warns, "Beware, then, of putting your trust in your own contrition and of ascribing forgiveness of sins to your own sorrow. God does not respect you because of that, but because of the faith by which you have believed his threatenings and promises, and which wrought such sorrow within you."⁸

Evil as the contrition practices are, however, "confession and satisfaction have become the chief workshop of greed and violence." Here Luther's earlier attacks are "briefly rehearsed" on the overabundance of "classifications" of sin, the "reservation" of certain cases from direct absolution for the sake of inquiry by higher authority, and the qualification of casuistical "circumstances" in the practice of priestly confession. As for indulgences, Luther is no longer "sunk in a mighty superstitious veneration for the Roman tyranny." For simplicity, therefore, readers may "burn up the whole of my writings on indulgences and substitute for them this proposition: Indulgences are a knavish trick of the Roman sycophants."⁹

6 *Ibid.*, II, 245.

7 *Ibid.*, II, 248.

8 *Ibid.*, II, 249.

9 *Ibid.*, II, 170.

Moreover, men's whole view of satisfaction has become so warped that they now believe that all is well "if they but mumble over, word for word, the prayers the priest has imposed, even though they never give a thought meanwhile to amending their life. . . . No thought is given here to the mortifying of the flesh; no value is attached to the example of Christ. . . . This perverse error is greatly encouraged by our absolving sinners before the satisfaction has been completed. . . . Absolution ought rather to follow on the completion of satisfaction, as it did in the ancient church, with the result that, after completing the work, penitents gave themselves with greater diligence to faith and the living of a new life."¹⁰

Finally, after Luther probes even deeper into the scriptural basis of a sacrament, he concludes that though penance has the proper grace-faith relation to God's Word, it still does not meet all the requirements of a sacrament.

It has seemed best to restrict the name of "sacrament" to such promises as have signs attached to them. The remainder, not being bound to signs, are bare promises. Hence there are, strictly speaking, but two sacraments in the church of God—baptism and bread; for only in these two do we find both the divinely instituted sign and the promise of forgiveness of sins. The sacrament of penance, which I added to these two, lacks the divinely instituted visible sign, and is, as I have said, nothing but a return to baptism (PE 2, 291).

SACRAMENT OF BAPTISM

Luther had already spelled out the inner relationship existing between penance and Baptism in his *Treatise on the Holy Sacrament of Baptism* (1519). There he develops his view of Baptism according to its sign, meaning, and appropriation by faith. The "sign" consists in being immersed and drawn out of water in the name of the triune God. The "meaning" underlying this action of the church is revealed by Christ and St. Paul in Scripture (John 3:3-5; Titus 3:5) as the necessary washing of regeneration of natural man, who has been conceived in original sin (Ps. 51:7). By water and the Spirit (grace), man is spiritually crucified and resurrected with Christ as God establishes a new relationship of love with him. Formerly "in Adam," he is now also "in Christ."

This is the proper understanding of the sacrament of Baptism. In this blessed

10 *Ibid.*, II, 254.

sacrament, God unites you with himself and you become one with him in a gracious, comforting covenant. . . . And from that hour on, he begins to make you new, pours into you his grace and the Holy Ghost, and begins to kill your flesh and sin in preparation for your dying and rising again on the Day of Judgment.¹¹

This is not to say that a baptized person will not sin. While God has begun to make him over anew, this transformation is not completed this side of death. Throughout this life man must live by faith in God's grace, and not trust in his own goodness. This means, in effect, that his persisting sin must constantly be fought in life-long repentance. In faith, man must die and be resurrected again daily if the covenant of grace into which he was initially baptized is to remain a living reality for him. In a life of God-guided piety, therefore, man fulfills his baptismal covenant by the performance of good works and the voluntary acceptance of suffering which contribute both to the mortification of his flesh and to the service of his neighbor.¹² The self-denial inherent in such a consecrated life is assumed joyfully by the believer in the grateful confidence that even his imperfect works of mercy are now God-pleasing when performed in faith.

Therefore, the Christian finds "no greater comfort on earth than in his Baptism."¹³ In grace and mercy God "looks through his fingers" at our sin and does not reckon it against us, but empowers us rather to work toward its eradication. As always, however, all the blessings of God's grace are finally dependent upon our acceptance of them in faith. While maintaining the inherent power of God's Word, Luther also insists that man's faith must accept what God offers. The sacraments efficaciously impart grace only when faith is unmistakably present.

This faith is essential, for it is the ground of all the comfort. One who does not have faith must doubt in sin, for the sin which remains in us even after Baptism makes all our good works impure before God. Therefore, man must hold fast to his Baptism against all attacks of sin and terrors of conscience. He must humbly confess, "I know very well that I have no pure works to offer, but I have been baptized and God does not lie to me. He has bound himself to me, and has promised not to reckon my sin against me but rather to eradicate and kill it."¹⁴

11 *Luthers Werke*, Weimarer Ausgabe (WA), II, 730.

12 WA, II, 730.

13 WA, II, 731.

14 WA, II, 732.

There are two kinds of faithless people whose piety is found wanting because they misunderstand the regenerative nature of Baptism. On the one hand, there are the lazy quietists who believe that they have been made perfect in Baptism and therefore evade good works as unnecessary for them. Because of their "pride, hate, and other natural evil," they fail to realize how vitally necessary their works of mercy are both to themselves and to others who depend upon them. The other misguided group is comprised of zealous activists who have succumbed to the idolatrous mania of putting their trust in their own merits and works in place of the grace of God. They have been falsely taught by Rome that they have lost the prevenient grace of Baptism in their sin and that they must replace this lost grace by earning merits and buying indulgences. Thereby they "make God a liar" in his promise of the life-long efficacy of the power of his baptismal covenant. Properly understood, penance does not replace Baptism but "has its ground in this sacrament."

The sacrament of penance renews and declares again the sacrament of Baptism. It is as if the priest says in the absolution, "God has now forgiven your sin as he promised to you in Baptism and to me in the power of the keys. You are once again restored to your baptismal covenant. If you believe it, you have it; if you doubt it, you are lost."¹⁵

The basic insights of this treatise are sharpened and extended when Luther treats Baptism afresh a year later in *The Babylonian Captivity*. Once again it is Luther's pastoral purpose to teach the people "what manner of men they are and how it becomes Christian to live."

Most significantly, Luther now regards the Word, the divine promise as given by grace and received by faith, as of primary and central importance. Sacramental authority rests solidly on the biblical words of promise, "He who believes and is baptized will be saved" (Mark 16:16). Since "God does not lie," sinners may confidently believe that his steadfast love is "ever ready to receive us back with open arms when we return." In repentance, "we do but return to the power and the faith of Baptism from whence we fell, and find our way back to the promise then made to us, from which we departed when we sinned." This is the Christian's greatest source of comfort: "Even if he would, he cannot lose his salvation, however much he sin, unless

15 *WA*, II, 733.

he will not believe." Baptized believers are certain of salvation! "This, if I mistake not, is the real meaning of the obscure saying, that Baptism is the beginning and foundation of all the sacraments, without which none of them can be received."¹⁶

On the basis of this scriptural authority, Luther chides Rome for de-emphasizing faith in its zealously to encourage "good" works, which, as faithless, could never be considered good by God. Thereby they have shifted the ground of salvation from God's Word to man's actions and destroyed man's certainty of salvation in his anxious quest for religious security in the ecclesiastical machinery of penance, satisfactions, and merits. "All the sacraments were instituted for the purpose of nourishing faith, but these godless men so completely pass over this faith that they even assert a man dare not be certain of the forgiveness of sins, that is, of the grace of the sacraments."¹⁷

Coupled with God's promise is the sign, or sacrament, which is "added to the divine promise to represent that which the words signify."¹⁸ Luther denounces both the Thomists and the Franciscans for their preoccupation with the sacramental signs at the expense of the sacramental Word. The sign as such is neither a container of God's grace nor merely a symbol of that grace. It is rather the medium through which God reveals himself to his people. "God is wont to add to well-nigh every promise of his a certain sign as a mark or memorial of his promise, so that we may thereby the more faithfully hold to his promise and be the more forcibly admonished by it. . . . Even so, in Baptism he adds to the promise the sign of immersion in water, . . . and as there is greater power in the Word than in the sign, so there is greater power in the testament than in the sacrament."¹⁹

Baptism, then, signifies two things—death and resurrection; that is, full and complete justification. The minister's immersing the child in the water signifies death; his drawing it forth again signifies life (Rom. 6:4). . . . This death and resurrection we call the new creation, regeneration, and the spiritual birth. And this must not be understood only in a figurative sense . . . but of actual death and resurrection. Wherefore, as soon as ever we begin to believe, we also begin to die to this world and live unto God in the life to come. . . . For as long as we

16 *Works of Martin Luther*, II, 220, 221.

17 *Ibid.*, II, 223.

18 *Ibid.*, II, 226.

19 *Ibid.*, II, 203.

live we are continually doing that which our Baptism signifies—we die and rise again.²⁰

SACRAMENT OF HOLY COMMUNION

That the graciousness of God and the faithfulness of man are both indispensable for an efficacious sacrament is also Luther's central message in treating Holy Communion. As with Baptism, "not the sacrament but the faith of the sacrament justifies. . . . The sacraments are not fulfilled when they are observed, but when they are believed."²¹ Luther's systematic treatment in *The Babylonian Captivity* rests upon an interesting background of shorter studies which first deserve our brief attention.

In the *Treatise on Worthy Reception of the Eucharist* (1518), Luther emphasizes the paradox that only those who feel themselves to be unworthy of the sacrament are truly worthy of it.²² We must approach the Lord's Supper in religious humility and spiritual hunger if we are to be fed with the bread of life. In a style parallel to his 1519 treatment of Baptism, Luther then analyzes Holy Communion according to its sign, meaning, and faith in his *Treatise on the Blessed Sacrament and on the Brotherhoods* (1519). What interests us particularly is that in connection with the "sign," Luther still stands on Roman Catholic ground (transubstantiation) as he declares that "the bread and the wine are transformed into Christ's real and true body and blood."²³

The "meaning or work" of the sacrament is declared to consist in the loving incorporation of the believer into oneness with Christ and the communion of saints (I Cor. 10:16-17). Luther employs two classical illustrations to demonstrate this reality.²⁴ The unity which Christians experience with their Lord and fellow believers may be likened to the individual kernels of grain which must lose their own form in order that they might be transformed and incorporated with others into a common loaf. So, too, must every Christian die unto self in order to be "baked together" with Christ and other believers into the common loaf of the community of saints. No closer union could be

20 *Ibid.*, II, 230.

21 *Ibid.*, II, 228, 229.

22 *WA*, I, 325 ff.

23 *WA*, II, 749.

24 *WA*, II, 748.

imagined than the food which becomes a living part of the person whom it nourishes. And in the union of communion, the believer feeds on Christ himself.

This provides the setting for the sharing, loving, forgiving, and serving which should mark the common life of every Christian community. Luther recalls how the word *collecta* in the mass originated in the ancient lay practice of bringing from home the sacramental elements, along with other foods and provisions for distribution to the poor and needy. It was the basic stuff of common life—bread and wine—which the church reverently consecrated to the glory of God and the service of fellow men. As Christ took on the form of man to serve mankind in love, we must likewise be conformed to the mind of Christ as we take on our neighbor's needs as our own cross. This undeserved sacrificial love is declared to constitute "the true fellowship and proper meaning of the sacrament."²⁵

But, concludes Luther, most important of all is that you truly believe that Christ here gives himself *for you*, since in this "lies the power of the sacrament." It is not even enough to have a correct theology of the sacrament, important as that is. There are all too many theological speculations about the mystery of the sacrament ("what happens to the bread?" "when does the transformation take place?" "how can the whole Christ be present in such a small piece of bread?" etc.) at the loss of all religious assurance that here God offers me pardon for my eternal life and power for my temporal life.²⁶ The Devil works intellectual doubts; God works trusting faith. "You must desire forgiveness and firmly believe that you have received it. . . . It is enough to know that this is a divine sign in which Christ's body and blood are truly present; entrust the 'how' and 'where' to him."²⁷ Then, and then alone, is the sacrament properly "exercising and comforting" our faith when it empowers us to meet the temporal crises of daily life and insures our safe passage through them to life everlasting.

Luther's next tract dealing with Holy Communion is entitled *A Treatise on the New Testament, That Is, The Holy Mass* (1520). A helpful approach to the material in this work is an examination of the

25 *Works of Martin Luther*, II, 748.

26 *WA*, II, 749.

27 *Loc. cit.*

interrelated meanings of three key terms as re-minted in the evangelical theology of the Reformer: testament, sacrament, and sacrifice.

Luther begins with a cryptic observation: "The less law, the more justice; the fewer commandments, the more good works." Yet the experience of Christians is that more and more liturgical rubrics and moral rules are being required of them daily at the expense of "true justice and piety" in the community. Once again, we are thrown back upon the foundation of the Word of God as the bed-rock of all evangelical piety. The simplicity and directness of Luther's formulation of the primacy of the grace of God testifies to the ever-growing clarity of his understanding of the heart of the Christian faith.

If man is to deal with God and receive anything from him, it must happen in this wise, not that man begin and lay the first stone, but that God alone, without any entreaty or desire of man, must first come and give him a promise. This Word of God is the beginning, the foundation, the rock, upon which all works, words, and thoughts of man must build. This Word man must gratefully accept, and faithfully believe the divine promise, and by no means doubt that it is and comes to pass just as he promises. This trust and faith is the beginning, middle, and end of all works and righteousness.²⁸

In the sacrament of Holy Communion, we must turn for God's promise back to the "words of Christ, by which he completed and instituted the mass and commanded us to observe it. For therein lies the whole mass, its nature, work, profit, and benefit, and without them [the words] no benefit is derived from the mass."²⁹ Luther finds deep religious certainty in grounding the sacrament on the Word of God rather than the words of men. "The nearer, now, our masses are to the first mass of Christ, the better, without doubt, they are; and the further from Christ's mass, the more perilous."³⁰

The graciousness of God is seen by the Christian, first and foremost, in his loving willingness to forgive the sins of his children. Luther now consistently centers the grace of God in the person and work of Christ. All the Old Testament promises of God to Adam, Noah, Abraham, David, and Moses are "fulfilled and confirmed" in Christ. And Christ himself "has made a promise or solemn vow, which

28 *Works of Martin Luther*, I, 297.

29 *Ibid.*, I, 297.

30 *Ibid.*, I, 296.

we are to believe and thereby come to godliness and salvation. This promise is the word in which Christ says, 'This is the cup of the New Testament' " in instituting the sacrament of Holy Communion.³¹

Christ's promise is called a "testament" because it is "the last irrevocable will of one who is about to die, whereby he bequeaths his goods, allotted and assigned to be distributed to whom he will."³² It is called "new" because the old testament made with the children of Israel through Moses is now "disannulled and made ineffective." The temporal and transitory blessings of the Old Testament must now give way to "Christ, the true Paschal Lamb, . . . who dies to establish a new testament in which the possessions therein bequeathed are eternal and abiding."³³

What then is this testament, and what is bequeathed us therein by Christ? Forsooth, a great, eternal, and unspeakable treasure, namely, the forgiveness of all sins (Matt. 26:28). It is as though he said: "Behold, man, in these words I promise and bequeath thee forgiveness of all thy sin and eternal life. And in order that thou mayest be certain and know that such promise remains irrevocably thine, I will die for it, and give my body and blood for it, and will leave them both to thee as sign and seal, that by them thou mayest remember me."³⁴

With this we have moved from the "testament" to the "sacrament," from the Word to the seal, from the promise to the sign. Here God further shows his graciousness by providing us with a tangible, personalized sign whereby "we are strengthened in faith, confirmed in hope, and made ardent in love. . . . Wherefore we sorely need this sacrament in which we may gain new strength when we have grown weak, and may daily exercise ourselves unto the strengthening and uplifting of the spirit."³⁵

For we poor men, since we live in our five senses, must always have, along with our words, at least one outward sign on which we may hold and around which we may gather; but in such wise that this sign may be a sacrament, that is, that it may be external and yet contain and express something spiritual, so that through the external we may be drawn into the spiritual, comprehending the

31 *Ibid.*, I, 299.

32 *Ibid.*, I, 299.

33 *Ibid.*, I, 300.

34 *Loc. cit.*

35 *Loc. cit.*

external with the eyes of the body, the spiritual and inward with the eyes of the heart.³⁶

Inherent in this radical distinction between "testament" and "sacrament" is Luther's repudiation of the Roman view of the infusion of grace through sacramental participation. Grace, for Luther, is not a supernatural quality or power which can be poured at will into the souls of men; it is rather the personal favor and good will which a loving God bears us. Consequently it is man's faith in the gracious promise of God's Word which alone justifies. The sacrament is God's gift to strengthen our faith in his testament, and it is this gracious promise of God which must be restored to its rightful central place in the theology and practice of the church. Incidentally, it should be clear from all this that there is nothing in Luther to support the argument sometimes heard today that the Sunday service is merely a graceless "torso" if it does not reach its "climax" in the "celebration of the Eucharist." Regarding the disputed question concerning the frequency of the sacrament, Luther offers us not a magic number but, more importantly, an evangelical priority.

Now since the testament is far more important than the sacrament, so the words are far more important than the signs. For the signs might be lacking, if only one have the words, and thus one might be saved without sacrament, yet not without testament. For I can daily enjoy the sacrament in the mass if I only keep before my eyes the testament, that is, the words and covenant of Christ, and feed and strengthen my faith thereby.³⁷

A host of practical abuses are then unmasked as dissonant with the Gospel of God's grace: the comforting promise of the words of institution in mumbled Latin, the withdrawal of the cup from the laity, the superstitious motives for multiplying masses endlessly, and the like. Most important for us is Luther's first clear denunciation of the view that the mass is a meritorious sacrifice, a bloodless repetition of the act of Christ on Calvary. In a rather mild beginning, Luther inaugurates here a life-long struggle against any and all who conceive of the grace of God as other than coming absolutely downward and

36 *Ibid.*, I, 301.

37 *Ibid.*, I, 306.

totally undeserved. It is Christ's sacrifice alone—once for all—which makes Christians of those who faithfully commit their lives to him.

So, too, I fear that many have made out of the mass a good work, whereby they thought to do a great service to Almighty God. Now, if we are rightly to understand what has been said above, namely, that the mass is nothing else than a testament and sacrament in which God pledges himself to us and gives us grace and mercy, I think it is not fitting that we should make a good work or merit out of it. . . . In the mass we give Christ nothing, but only take from him; unless they are willing to call this a good work, that man be quiet and permit himself to be benefited, to be given food and drink, to be clothed and healed, helped and redeemed.³⁸

Luther concludes, "We should, therefore, give careful heed to this word 'sacrifice,' that we do not presume to give God something in the sacrament, when it is he who therein gives us all things."³⁹ Properly understood, the Christian does not make dead sacrifices but is rather "a living sacrifice" (Rom. 12:1). He offers nothing less than himself to God in prayer, praise, and thanksgiving.

What sacrifices then are we to offer? Ourselves, and all that we have, with constant prayer, as we say, "Thy will be done on earth as in heaven." Wherefore we are to yield ourselves to the will of God, that he may do with us what he will, according to his own pleasure. In addition, we are to offer him praise and thanksgiving with our whole heart for his unspeakable, sweet grace and mercy, which he has promised and given us in this sacrament.⁴⁰

And even "this sacrifice of prayer, praise, and thanksgiving, and of ourselves, we are not to present before God in our own person, but we are to lay it on Christ and let him present it. . . . We do not offer Christ as a sacrifice, but Christ offers us."⁴¹ In this limited eucharistic sense—and in this sense alone—Luther concedes that "it is permissible, yea, profitable, to call the mass a sacrifice, not on its own account, but because we offer ourselves as a sacrifice along with Christ; that is, we lay ourselves on Christ by a firm faith in his testament and appear before God with our prayer, praise, and sacrifice only through him and

38 *Ibid.*, I, 308.

39 *Ibid.*, I, 313.

40 *Loc. cit.*

41 *Ibid.*, I, 314.

through his mediation; and we do not doubt that he is our priest and minister in heaven before God."⁴²

As we return now to *The Babylonian Captivity*, we find that Luther has organized all of his previous misgivings concerning Roman sacramental practice under three central "captivities," the first of which is Rome's withholding of the cup from the laity. This "monstrous perversion" of the clear institution of Christ and practice of St. Paul "seems to date from the time when we began for the sake of the riches of this world to rage against Christian love."⁴³ It is a "wicked and despotic practice" rooted in the unevangelical notion that it is the sacerdotal clergy rather than the whole congregation which celebrates at the mass. "The fault lies not with the laity, but with the priests. The sacrament does not belong to the priests, but to all, and the priests are not lords but ministers, in duty bound to administer both kinds to those who desire them, and as oft as they desire them. If they wrest this right from the laity and forcibly withhold it, they are tyrants."⁴⁴

The second main captivity is the Roman dogma of sacramental transubstantiation which teaches that the substance of the bread and wine is transformed into the substance of the body and blood of Christ while the attributes of the elements remain humanly perceptible. We have seen that Luther still shared this view in 1519, but already in the *Treatise on the New Testament* he spoke of "the sacrament, bread and wine, and under them his true body and blood" in language suggesting their co-existence. After "floating in this sea of doubt," Luther goes much farther in 1520 and actually attacks transubstantiation—"a monstrous word for a monstrous doctrine." After a long tirade against the doctrine's non-scriptural foundations in the metaphysics of Aristotle and Aquinas, Luther's pastoral concern breaks to the fore.

My one concern at present is to remove all scruples of conscience, so that no one may fear to become guilty of heresy if he should believe in the presence of real bread and wine on the altar, and that everyone may feel at liberty to ponder, hold, and believe either one view or the other, without endangering his salvation.⁴⁵

Yet Luther feels constrained "to set forth my own view." Again

⁴² *Loc. cit.*

⁴³ *Ibid.*, II, 183.

⁴⁴ *Ibid.*, II, 186.

⁴⁵ *Ibid.*, II, 189.

the biblical words of institution—"bread . . . wine, body . . . blood" become determinative as the "good grounds" of his view. "No violence is to be done to the words of God, whether by man or angel; but they are to be retained in their simplest meaning wherever possible, and to be understood in their grammatical and literal sense unless the context plainly forbids, lest we give our adversaries occasion to make a mockery of all the Scriptures."⁴⁶ What interests us here is Luther's uncompromising refusal to "dabble too much" in metaphysical philosophy regarding the unfathomable graciousness of God. "What matters it if philosophy cannot fathom this? The Holy Spirit is greater than Aristotle."⁴⁷ "Even though philosophy cannot grasp this, faith grasps it, and the authority of God's Word is greater than the grasp of our intellect."⁴⁸

Luther rejoices greatly that "the simple faith of this sacrament is still to be found at least among the common people." His fear is that the philosophical subtleties of the schoolmen in regard to the sacrament will ultimately do violence to the Incarnation of God in Christ and take away the certainty of the grace of God and the salvation of men. Luther cites some parallel Christological examples. Shall we now say that the flesh of the Virgin was annihilated and transubstantiated as Christ came forth out of the unopened womb of his mother? Or again, shall we contend the same miraculous transformation of the finite in the risen Christ's passing through the closed door in the upper room and the closed mouth of the sepulcher? No, says Luther, it is imperative that if God's gracious act in Christ is to be both salvatory and vicarious, then both natures must be confessed to persist and co-exist.

Therefore it is with the sacrament even as it is with Christ. In order that the Godhead may dwell in him, it is not necessary that the human nature be transubstantiated and the Godhead be contained under its accidents; but both natures are there in their entirety, and it is truly said, "This man is God," and "This God is man."⁴⁹

Against this Christological background, the third captivity follows

46 *Loc. cit.*

47 *Ibid.*, II, 193.

48 *Ibid.*, II, 194.

49 *Ibid.*, II, 193.

as a climactic conclusion: the sacrament of Holy Communion is no good work or human sacrifice. Since Luther found it expedient to incorporate extended sections and even whole pages from his previous works into his present treatment, we find that we have already covered the essence of his argument. The central motifs reappear with remarkable consistency: the primacy of grace and its apprehension by faith; the distinction between "testament" (promise) and "sacrament" (sign) and its resultant repudiation of any human meritorious sacrifice; the inevitability of good works following the reborn Christian's justification by grace, but the idolatry inherent in reversing this evangelical order in the Christian life. "For God does not deal, nor has he ever dealt, with man otherwise than through a word of promise, as I have said; again, we cannot deal with God otherwise than through faith in the word of his promise."⁵⁰

Luther's bold insistence that the "sacrament" be subject to the "testament" could not be tolerated long by Rome. The papal bull *Exsurge Domine*, signed by Pope Leo X on June 15, 1520, commended "that son of iniquity, Martin Luther" to recant his "heretical errors." On October 10 it finally reached Luther along with the news of the burning of his condemned works in the cities of Cologne and Louvain. It did not take Luther long to return in kind. On December 10 the Wittenberg faculty and students were invited to assemble at the Chapel of the Holy Cross near the Elster gate. In a spirit of righteous indignation and reverent fear Luther watched as his colleagues committed volume after volume of canon law and scholastic theology to a large bonfire. Finally, the climax was reached as Luther himself stepped forward and cast the notorious bull into the flames with the damning words, "Because thou hast brought down the truth of God, may the Lord today bring thee down into the fire!" In less than ten minutes the affair was over, but its flames were destined to burn for centuries.

50 *Ibid.*, II, 201.

Paul Gerhardt (1607-1676): an Evaluation

BY WOLFGANG TRILLHAAS¹

SHYLY, with lightstruck, childlike eyes and indrawn mien, the poet looks out at us in the only picture we have of him, this poet who among the innumerable spiritual counselors of our people (including others than the so-called "songbook Christians") is the best known and the best loved. Paul Gerhardt, born in the same year as Corneille and Rembrandt and a contemporary of Milton, Calderon, and Pascal, surely knew nothing of these creative spirits. Beaten, tossed about, and indelibly confirmed in his Christian faith during the difficult period of the Thirty Years' War, he lived in the shadow of world history. We know only a few rather characteristic details of his life. He personally lifted not one finger to make himself known. In fact, we should know almost nothing of him if two choirmasters, Johann Crüger and then, following Crüger's death in 1662, Johann Georg Ebeling, had not divested their silent friend of his hymns and then given those hymns oral expression on the wings of their captivating melodies, first for their choir schools and then for the parish itself.

Yet in these hymns Paul Gerhardt has remained close to us. Approximately one-third of his poetical legacy survives to this day in our evangelical hymnals. Not only did he inspire and motivate the composers of his time, but J. S. Bach, Friedrich Mergner, Arnold Mendelssohn, and others from Max Reger on down to Ernest Pepping have endorsed him as being relevant and powerful for their time as well as for ours.

I

Paul Gerhardt was born in the little town of Gräfenhainichen in electoral Saxony, south of Wittenberg, on March 12, 1607. He was the second of four children of Christian Gerhardt, whom we may picture as a substantial rural citizen. The father was a man held in respect, one who even in younger years served as one of the three

1 Translated by Edward A. Johnson from the *Nachrichten der evangelisch-lutherischen Kirche in Bayern*, January and February, 1957.

alternate incumbent mayors of his village and who, two years prior to the birth of our poet, had married Dorothea Starke, the daughter of the superintendent at Eilenburg. After his father's early death young Paul, from 1622 to 1627, came under the wise and stern discipline of the electoral school at Grimma. From that period we have no record of the youngster, who was not outstanding. Several fortuitously preserved records testify that he was not exactly among the best students, but that his superiors were satisfied with him. Devoutly he assimilated the humanistic culture of the time and was enriched by a rigidly orthodox education in the Bible and the Confessions, but above all in Flutter's *Compendium locorum theologicorum*. Under these circumstances his admission to the university in Wittenberg, where he matriculated around New Year's Day in 1628, hardly denoted any transition to a new world. We know little about his studies, but a subsequent period has indicated with what an open mind he appropriated the spirit of stalwart Lutheranism under the theological faculty which kept watch over the *cathedra Lutheri*. In any event we must not regard the spirit of the university as hidebound by our standards. Student life (in which, admittedly, Paul Gerhardt took little part) was hearty and lusty and raw, and provoked the stern academic discipline of the school on one occasion after another. There also was spirited intellectual intercourse. Music, poetry, and culture were quite at home in the professors' houses. Paul Gerhardt shared richly in these fields after becoming a private tutor in the home of Archdeacon M. Fleischhauer. The reform ideas and standards of Martin Opitz, who was himself in Wittenberg in 1625, found alert interpreters in Professors Röber and Buchner, who were then at the university and who must have moved even young Gerhardt himself.

And yet, above all else, there was the long war which hovered over and around Wittenberg. The angel of death took generously what came to him. At Easter, 1637, Paul Gerhardt's home town of Gräfenhainichen sank in rubble and ashes, and a few weeks later his older brother went to his grave. That same year the school at Grimma closed its doors. In 1640 a disastrous fire swept over Wittenberg. Paul Gerhardt was still there and was still classified as a "student." At that time one's student days and their termination were not yet as regulated as they are today. One simply kept on studying until a position was available somewhere. But this man who was much given to introspection

obviously had not exerted himself to seek a position. Only from a chance announcement do we learn that in September, 1643, he found himself in Berlin. How passively he must have faced life may be ascertained from the fact that during the long years at Wittenberg he did not take the opportunity to obtain his master's degree, as did most of the clergymen who subsequently came to both degrees and positions. In Berlin Paul Gerhardt was still active as an instructor and house tutor in the home of one Berthold. Yet we must honestly confess that of these years we know nothing of the poet save one fact, although this is quite decisive: the beginning of his poetry dates from this time.

The father of the Lutheran hymnal, Johann Crüger of Berlin, published a book, the size of which steadily increased with subsequent editions and the second edition of which bore the title *Praxis pietatis melica*. Here, for the first time, Paul Gerhardt's hymns saw publication. Edition followed quickly upon edition. When the fourth edition appeared, eight of Paul Gerhardt's hymns had been included. The mature poet thus stands before us, not with the usual preliminary flirtations of self-conscious juvenalia, but with work which was "born in the hymnal" from the very beginning.

Just as the poet came quite late to his poetry, so he entered very late upon his ministry. Not until the end of 1651 was the forty-four-year-old man ordained in order to assume a probationary post at Mittenwalde, southwest of Berlin, on the recommendation of the *Geistliches Ministerium* of Berlin. Alone he entered upon his work in this parish which had been extensively damaged during the war. Then, in 1653, appeared Crüger's *Praxis* with eight of Paul Gerhardt's hymns. On February 1, 1655, at the age of forty-eight, Paul Gerhardt was first married, to the thirty-two-year-old daughter of the Berthold family with whom he had lived while in Berlin and had later maintained a continuing relationship. Five children were born to this marriage, which lasted for thirteen years, years which, though generally happy ones, were also constantly beclouded with sorrow. The parents lost four of their children after only a short time. Only one son, Andreas Christian, survived his father.

In 1657 Paul Gerhardt exchanged his work at Mittenwalde for the post of a deacon in St. Nicholas' Church in Berlin. Thanks to the tragic dispute in which he became involved, which we shall discuss shortly, we have received documents from these years which afford

us our first really accurate impression of this man's pastoral activity. He evidently enjoyed more than the usual esteem and all-around trust. Only under this assumption are we able to understand the way in which both the village and the territorial authorities took this pastor's side in the turbulence of those days and interceded on his behalf with the elector. Then, too, the documents from the ecclesiastical struggle furnish us with some insight as to how he stood with his colleagues. The security of his pulpit assured, he now emerged as an adviser in theological disputes, as a leading figure in the encounter with Reformed theologians of the city, as a champion of orthodoxy, and as a man of sharp (today we would certainly say too sharp) polemics and clarity.

What was involved in the struggle in which Paul Gerhardt, after his first five peaceful years in the ministry, became engaged? For our generation the matter is so foreign that only by deliberately setting aside modern standards of judgment can we hope to understand and judge the issues aright. On December 18, 1613, Elector Johann Sigismund of Brandenburg made public his personal profession of the Calvinist faith. From the beginning this event had double import, for the elector thereby became the first prince in Europe to declare for freedom of belief and of conscience. But that age had no stomach for such things. The principle of *cuius regio, eius religio* still prevailed according to which the religion of the prince became the norm for his subjects as well. Yet it was not only traditional religious law, or the orthodoxism then thriving in all of the confessions, which afforded conceivably incompatible grounds for the concept of tolerance. In all discussion of this concept there cropped out all too clearly the principle of *Staatsraison*, the idea of the state which both strengthened and relativized all positions of faith. Another special aspect appeared. The transition of the elector of Brandenburg to the Reformed faith was but one more manifestation of the progressive penetration of Calvinism which could be observed during the last decades of the previous century. The Palatinate, Hesse, Nassau, Anhalt, and eventually no fewer than twenty-four German lands, or at the very least princely houses, went over to Calvin's side and thus were lost to Lutheranism. This development far overshadowed the Roman Catholic Counter-Reformation and awakened among Lutherans a deep, bitter feeling and continual distrust. Even Johann Sigismund, one year after his conversion,

found cause to issue an edict prohibiting polemics in the pulpit. This was plausible enough; the pulpit was still plainly the place for public proclamation, just as the press and the radio serve that purpose today.

About the middle of the century the tension was renewed. In 1662 the Great Elector issued several edicts aimed at encouraging ecclesiastical concord. He prompted theological conversations between Reformed and Lutheran church leaders under the auspices of the consistory. Actually, for them it was bad accompanying music that the elector at the same time (and as a countermeasure against the increasingly more vigorous polemics at Wittenberg) forbade his subjects to study at Luther's university. Events moved along. In 1664 the elector required a written oath to abstain from confessional disputes in the pulpit. For the first time Lutheranism, always obedient to the state, found itself standing in opposition to the government. In April, 1665, the first nonconformists were discharged, and Paul Gerhardt himself received a strenuous reprimand. On February 6, 1666, removal from office was hastened for this man who still gave resolute opposition, and all the repeated protests of the secular officials and finally even of the territorial powers were of no avail. Eventually, on January 9 of the following year, the elector terminated his "reverse journey" and reinstated in office this victim of tender conscience. But now this tragedy of conscience reached its boiling point. Paul Gerhardt did not resume his office. He thought it treason to go back to it in such an abject fashion without some evidence of a change in the elector's own basic convictions. Actually, the elector had mellowed somewhat; he had acquired new respect for the conscience of his Lutheran pastors. Yet now, suddenly, his patience and his understanding were strained; and just at the very moment when the entire situation was growing less tense he gave Paul Gerhardt a successor and finally turned the sixty-one-year-old man out of office and out of a livelihood.

Five months earlier Gerhardt's wife had died. With his little six-year-old son the man whose energies had been depleted in the fight between the old ways of confessional discourse and the modern concept of "tolerance" now stood, alone, on the threshold of old age. The time would soon come when the historic misunderstandings which had allowed the situation on both sides to reach this tragic state would at last be cleared up. For Paul Gerhardt one thing only mattered: his conscience was clear. What he is credited with saying after his last

official act was no empty phrase: "Some little thing is out of kilter up in Berlin. I am willing and ready to confirm evangelical truth with my blood. I, Paul, am ready to bare my neck to the sword, just as another Paul did." His grandfather Starke, along with other spiritual leaders of that day, had just been expelled from office under identical circumstances. Many of his pastoral colleagues also proudly called themselves "exiles." In a worthy and genuinely grateful letter of thanks Paul Gerhardt declined an offer from the countess of Lippe, who had offered some sustenance to him in those critical days. He regarded her moral support as though it had come from the heavenly Father himself, but he would not take advantage of the proffered way of escape: "I for my part suffer God to rule here below and am well satisfied with his most holy governance after he has allowed me just this one thing: that my poor conscience may not be sickened and troubled."

While he was without an office Paul Gerhardt, pending his reinstatement, still enjoyed an official income. Then, too, his small resources, and perhaps also—after the custom of the time—many a donation from some well-to-do friend and admirer, must have tided him over. But his poetic muse fell silent. We know that after 1667 he wrote no more hymns. Only a few poems for special occasions, especially verses commemorating deceased friends and persons of note, have survived. Obviously, with his inwardly oriented ways (which bordered on the impractical) he never exerted himself to obtain a new office. What was needed was the silent help of his numerous friends who, during a vacancy in the archdiaconate of Lübben in Lower Lusatia, called the attention of the council there to our poet. Events moved up to his formal presentation. In the official proceedings which, remarkably enough, have come down to us there is not a single mention of his significance as a poet, and even (so it would seem) a concerted, deliberate effort to pass this by. He weighed the matter over in his mind. At that time he had domestic problems in Berlin since his widowed sister-in-law and her son, together with their servants, still caused him considerable concern. On this account, when he finally accepted the post at Lübben and moved into the parsonage, he had to make many trips back to Berlin to straighten matters out. But Paul Gerhardt was now back in his native Saxony, where he spent the last seven years of his life. The year 1674 took from him the sister-in-law

who still managed his home, and shortly thereafter he lost the oldest of his still surviving sisters. As he entered upon the seventieth year of his life he wrote, with a premonition of his own approaching end, a last will and testament which was primarily a pastoral writing couched in biblical language and directed to his son, who had just passed his thirteenth birthday. This writing gives us some indication of what this preacher and shepherd of souls must have been to his congregations and what we, in view of the little that he left behind for us, can only surmise:

Now that I have reached the seventieth year of my life, and have with it the joyous hope that my dear and holy God will shortly release me from this world and lead me into a better life than I have known on earth, I thank him above everything else for all the goodness and faithfulness which he has shown me from my mother's womb up to the last hour and for his care of my body and soul and all that he has given to me. . . . To my only surviving son I leave little in the way of worldly goods, but I do leave an honorable name, of which he especially will have no need to be ashamed. My son knows that ever since his tender childhood I have given him to the Lord my God as his own in order that he might become a servant and preacher of his holy Word. Thus shall he now remain and not turn aside, if but for a few good days, elsewhere; for the dear God is well aware of all this and can bountifully replace outward tribulation with inward joy of heart and happiness of the Spirit. . . ."

On May 27, 1676, on the Wednesday after Pentecost, the faithful man passed from this life. He was laid to rest in the church at Lübben, probably close by the altar. So far as we know, the public took no perceptible notice of his death.

II

Paul Gerhardt's poetical writings, in so far as they were published during his lifetime, are probably complete as we know them. We also know of his Latin verse, which in general consisted of occasional lyrics of devout piety, arising mostly from funereal occasions. These round out the picture, yet they remain peripheral appearances. But the astonishing aspect of his work comes to the fore when one thinks, in contrast, of Gerhardt's most prolific poet-contemporary, Johann Rist, and of how little of his enormous legacy of hymns still remains in our hymnals. Of his 700 known hymns only 10 are still

used, and of the 1,200 hymns which came to us from Benjamin Schmolck, two generations after Gerhardt, the present German hymnal has but six. Paul Gerhardt, on the other hand, lives on in the voices of today's singing congregations with fully one-third of his hymns still in our hymnals!

Let us consider very briefly the statistical side of the picture. Paul Gerhardt was, without lamenting the fact, a child of his time in that he wrote his poems according to a pattern or a model. Of his 133 hymns, 27 were based upon psalms and 24 upon other biblical models. Five hymns were adaptations of prayers from the *Paradiesgärtlein* of Johann Arndt, the general superintendent at Celle. This was one of the most widely used prayer books of that time. Seven hymns, among them the Good Friday hymn "O Sacred Head Now Wounded," are compositions based on certain hymns by Bernard of Clairvaux. When, furthermore, one considers how often and how spontaneously biblical and choral associations must have come to the poet's tongue and pen (for he lived intimately with the Bible and the hymnal of his time), one understands why there is no end to the evidence of "dependence," of receiving advice and of adapting others' ideas. And yet, just as the abundance of Old Testament quotations in his writings in no way diminishes the greatness of St. Paul, missionary to the nations, so likewise all that we say about such dependence here (or, more abstractly, about tonal harmony) will in no way diminish the reputation of one who has demonstrated his ability as a poet. There is no musician for whom old melodies have not provided the inspiration for great compositions. There is no poet who has not felt himself challenged by old motifs which down through the centuries remain "still the same," while yet stimulating the poet to produce something new, entirely on his own, something a little bit different by which he may express himself truly and honestly as only he can. And precisely because Paul Gerhardt does belong among the tried and tested poets, our attention is diverted neither by the old motifs in his hymns nor by the original pattern which shines through them.

Something else should be said too. One who would not on occasion be obsessed with the temptation to play with rhymes would be no poet. Even Paul Gerhardt, as a child of the Age of Baroque with its quaint if sometimes grotesque poetry, played with rhymes. But who in sing-

ing this morning hymn (translation by Richard Massie) still perceives his rhythmic caprice?

Evening and morning,
 Sunset and dawning,
 Wealth, peace, and gladness,
 Comfort in sadness,
 These are Thy works; all the glory be Thine!
 Times without number,
 Awake or in slumber,
 Thine eye observes us,
 From danger preserves us,
 Causing Thy mercy upon us to shine.

At times this rhythmic play is hardly endurable, even for us. The hymn *Alle die ihr Gott zu Ehren* contains stanzas which run like this one: "Sleep, O best of all good things; sleep, O pearl of the emotions. Lo! O! Sleep, my comfort, 'tis none like Thee. Milk and honey must give way to Thee; sleep, thou noble guest of my heart! Lo! O! Sleep and rest; sleep, sleep, dear lily blossom!"

But Paul Gerhardt not only engaged in such formal rhythmic play and cleverness (which, incidentally, we find slipping past us again and again, with a sort of comic seriousness, in the cantatas of Bach). He also played in a similar vein with motifs that were pregnant with meaning, and even with biblical motifs. Who shall say after three centuries how much of this play (so far as the poet himself was concerned) was really play and how much of it was truly in earnest? Here one is reminded of that hymn in which the poet applies to himself, as a symbol of Christian humility, the "little dog" which the Canaanite woman mentions to Jesus in Matt. 15:24. The poet arrives at this tasteless variation: "Lord, I would very much like to remain as I am, Thy poor little dog." Where are we to stop with such playfulness? Yet a peculiar matter-of-fact attitude still predominates in the almost balladic manner in which many materials from the Gospels are, as it were, retold—e.g., the hymns of the circumcision of Jesus, of the seven words on the Cross, or of Jesus' burial: "As God's lamb and God's lion, fallen asleep and expired, He awakens the love and loyalty of two very devout Jews. They came to the Cross to bring Thee, O our eternal Rest, to Thine own rest."

Certainly we can no longer equal the length of the poems, some of which extend to thirty or more verses. And yet, here we still stand in the midst of the poet's rhythmic playfulness (which after all marks but the periphery of Paul Gerhardt's work) and the most pleasurable of other things, as in the hymn dedicated to "the marvelous estate of marriage." This particular hymn has seventeen stanzas—but a crass investigation of effort would almost amount to deadening the joy of the occasion. Then, suddenly, there spreads out before our eyes God's own garden, saturated with blessings and sunshine, and we are thus challenged: "My heart, go forth and seek joy in this dear summer-time, in the gifts of your God. Behold the charm of the beautiful gardens; see how they have decked themselves out for you and for me."

Now everything merits fond consideration: the earthly kingdom, the trees, Narcissus and the tulips (in which every syllable becomes music!), lark and nightingale, clucking hen, stork, swallow, the hart—and we are suddenly transported to Paradise. The hymn ends—as a prayer, should one say?—or should one say as a grand, tumultuous finale? Both would be correct. The bard himself turns into a blessed, beautiful flower: "Help me and bless my spirit with a blessing that streams from heaven that I might bloom always unto Thee. . . . Choose me for Paradise and let me flourish in body and soul even to the last branch. Thus will I serve Thee and Thy glory, and none besides Thee here any more, and I will serve Thee eternally there." Here the hymn ascends to its climax. Thousands of children still sing it today as though it were from our time. Nothing stands between such a bard and us. *Ecce poeta!*

III

So far as the content of Paul Gerhardt's poetry is concerned, one might well assume that the poet's orthodoxy sets the tone in advance. If we exclude the fact that we find in him neither didactic lyrics nor confessional polemic, the thought of his orthodox Lutheranism naturally has some foundation. Here is his childlike and everywhere radiant faith in creation. It is faith in Jesus Christ who has reconciled us with God and taken our guilt upon himself. "My sin cannot oppress me, for Thou hast taken all my burden upon Thy shoulders."

Here is the most inward sort of adoration of the divine incarna-

tion on Christmas, and also the adoration of the Crucified, of his head, his hands, and his feet. Here is the assurance of being God's child, able to trust confidently in his providence in all things. All this is Paul Gerhardt's Lutheranism. But should this faith be confined only to Lutherans? Paul Gerhardt, who feared "syncretism" and the confusion of religions as he feared Satan himself, and who had suffered precisely on this account in the polemical strife between Lutherans and Reformed, nonetheless taught men to sing so that every devout Calvinist and perhaps even the Catholic could join in song together. Here he did not touch upon doctrinal distinctions. In fact, we have only one of his Communion hymns—one, and no more.

It follows from just this momentary perspective that the faith which Paul Gerhardt confessed in song, and the content and orientation of his hymns, cannot be explained simply on the basis of the ecclesiastical turmoil in which he was involved. Certainly the poet took back not one iota of his Lutheran confession; yet this note passes inconspicuously by. Sixteen of his hymns begin with the little word "I," and by far the majority of them strike this personal note. Nowhere does the poet lack an answer to the question, "What does this mean to me?" "Be content and still in the God of your life, for in him rests the fullness of all joys. Without him you exert yourself in vain. He is your source and sun; daily he shines brightly for your joy. Be content!"

Or we think of the greatest hymn of consolation, *Befehl du deine Wege*. Indeed, these hymns do not comfort us merely by what they say. Occasionally the hymns of consolation mount up to heavenlike, jubilant spirals, taking on as it were the comfort they seek to impart rather than waiting for it to sprout forth in the soul: "Soar up to your God, you troubled soul! Why, mocking him, do you lie in the abyss of sadness? Do you not mark Satan's cunning? He seeks by his warfare to snuff out your consolation which Jesus Christ has secured for you."

By virtue of such pearls, which may be found in every hymnal, Paul Gerhardt became the great pedagogue of consolation for Christendom on the threshold of the modern age.

Here already, and without question, enters Pietism, even somewhat negatively and on silent feet, over the threshold of Protestantism. The song of the church, of the Christian community and the fellow-

ship of saints, is almost wholly absent. The tone which Gerhardt gives to Pentecost runs through more than just his Pentecost hymns, which still know only that confirmation and stance as a child of God which climbs up into the mystical realm and penetrates into the innermost of joys. Consider (Massie's translation) the hymn "If God Himself Be for Me":

His Holy Spirit dwelleth
 Within my willing heart,
 Tames it when it rebelleth,
 And soothes the keenest smart.
 He crowns his work with blessing,
 And helpeth me to cry
 "My Father!" without ceasing
 To him who reigns on high.

But with this we already have mentioned yet another motif characteristic of our poet which we must now describe in some detail. We shall call it the motif of comparison or, better still perhaps, of *climax*. The poet continually speaks to himself and constantly encourages others to do likewise: "Behold! Look! What kind of miracle have we here?" What the eye can see is not enough: this must still be uplifted, admired, and made known. We should note, in this connection, the Christmas hymn, "I stand here at Thy cradle": "I behold Thee with joy and cannot be satiated with the seeing; and because I can do nothing more, I behold what has happened. O that my thoughts were an abyss and my soul a deep ocean, that I might comprehend Thee!"

These thoughts (all sobriety of the man notwithstanding) are purely mystical thoughts. It was not in vain that he took as poetic models Bernard of Clairvaux and John Arndt, the Lutheran author of inspirational writings who was nourished by Catholic asceticism. For here, indeed, is revealed the true sense of the so-called "hymn of edification" (*Erbauungslied*), which begins with Paul Gerhardt in the history of evangelical hymnody. But to infer only sensuousness and flowery rhetoric would be a gross misinterpretation. When this type of piety considers that it has inner resources enough and to spare, it resists with bitter earnestness any attempt to become overly sweet and sentimental. The poet, turned inward upon himself, has clearly shown us, in the withdrawn or in any event impractical manner in which he was accustomed to live, how serious it all was with him.

In the banal sense of the term, our poet admittedly was everything but an ascetic. We know that he was an ardent chain smoker, a habit which incurred the anger of many of the "pious" people of that time. He enjoyed life, and he showed it again and again. In fact, we can honestly say that his widespread influence and significance rest not least on the fact that, to a degree hitherto unencountered, in his hymns he has brought the gay life of the common people comfortably and pleasurably into its own. But he beheld everything "in God," *sub specie aeternitatis*, not only joy but above all sorrow and pain; evening and morning, the seasons and the year's end, marriage and the family, war and peace, and finally the farewell to a small child in its coffin, his preparation for his own death, and his hope of a beautiful eternity. Nothing more and nothing less is involved than the whole of human life. He did not glorify it; he left it just as it always was, as it is, as it shall be: but through it all he made God's will known, God's consolation, his leadership, and the mystery of his fatherly intentions. As elemental as the Bible itself is this spiritual bard who, so to speak, so well described those things which concern you and me, quite apart from any ecclesiastical restrictions and confessional barriers.

It has been noticed, with some justification, that Paul Gerhardt's hymns are lacking in what might be termed "activism," in "motifs" which stand out in contrast to the abundantly available "quietives" of his poetry (as they sometimes have been called). Yet how many men of the active life still have taken his hymns and made them their own! A day's course might begin with Paul Gerhardt's morning hymns, "Awake, My Soul, and Sing Ye" or "Praise the Lord, All Ye That Fear Him." With such hymns as these one might well depart for the day's work, even though they contain no moral philosophy and no clarion calls to action. He who goes to sleep with the poet's evening hymns, "The Day With Its Light" or the comforting "Now Rest Beneath Night's Shadow," learns to leave behind him the small things which enervate modern man and rob him of sleep. From these hymns proceeds a strengthening, affirmative frame of mind which is hardly confined to the time in which these hymns originated. In this spirit, as we have said, the whole of life finds fulfillment. The day's course receives its first upward shaft of inspiration; one's love for wife and children is permeated with deep gratitude to God; and the hymn of thanksgiving for the peace of 1648, "Praise God, Now Hath Re-

sounded," has brought back a certain disturbing reality to our generation.

Paul Gerhardt is certainly the greatest source of consolation in the hymnal. Yet this should not forever be repeated with critical connotations, for comfort is by all means the certification of the Gospel. That does not exclude the realization that here comfort sometimes acquires a scarcely perceptible rationalistic by-taste when reference is made to God's providence, counsel, and omniscience: "Each one finds and takes what the Highest appoints for him. What is determined in heaven is wont to happen on earth, and whatever now befalls one is accordingly very well discharged."

Paul Gerhardt certainly did not mean this in terms of the later rationalism. As a poet he was always as a child, having about him no preconceived notions and no mental reservations or irony. For that reason even the children of our generation feel the truth of his approach and the veracity of his faith. But rather than ferret out that "quietism" which surely has been the regnant trait of his widespread influence in the singing church, it would be better to point out two of his other traits. One of them would be his inward orientation upon himself, his tendency toward depth and away from the transitory, illusory aspects of the visible world. We have already pointed out the poet's intrinsic mysticism. The other trait is his joy, which predominates in all things and is capable of kindling itself from visible things, the good things of the abundant life and the grace of the Creator without at the same time exhausting itself with them. It is the joy of the child of God whom nothing on earth can rob of his status as his Father's child. It is a joy wrung out of the trials and temptations of life. In striving for it the poet, tempted in Satan's sieve, has become a new Asaph, as the caption states beneath his picture in the church at Lübben. How this joy soars upward to the heights of sturdy triumph! "Christ's innocence is my glory, his justice my crown, his merit my possession; for I dwell in them free, as in a strong castle which no enemy can conquer."

Or we think of the hymn which is perhaps most highly esteemed among the songs of faith and joy which two millennia of Christian poetry have produced, "All my Heart this Night Rejoices." This song alone would be enough to insure our poet a lasting memorial in history. Where is there anything stronger than the verse: "Undismayed

and undaunted, a Christian should always allow himself to be seen, wherever he is. Though death seek to destroy him, his courage still should remain quiet, in good and refined fashion." Every verse would be worthy of citation here, for this hymn plunges on through the testimony of confidence and freedom with God and on up at last to the tenderest sounds of the certainty of being at one with the Redeemer: "Thou art mine, O my Light, because I lay hold of Thee and will not let Thee leave my heart. Let me, O let me be satisfied, for Thou wilt encompass me and I Thee, my own."

In conclusion, let us look once more at the mien of our poet. He was a loyal, conscientious, and charming Lutheran pastor (though for that matter there may since have been hundreds and thousands like him, men of whom history has taken no notice). How small, on the surface, was the radius of his life! It is eighty miles from his birth-place near Wittenberg to his city of destiny, Berlin; and the elector's school at Grimma, the outermost point in his life history, lies a hundred miles from Berlin, while Lübben is fifty miles distant. Since we do not know of the man's travels, even by implication, we may take it for granted that this was his total area of operation during his lifetime. Only against his will, in bondage to his conscience and in his adverse fortune, did he become a fighter. His influence did not extend over a wide area. He introduced no new ideas to his time. He was no Luther—and yet he has come to tower even over the Reformer in the Protestant hymnal, not only in the number of his hymns but also by virtue of their quiet, unheralded influence. To us, three centuries later, he speaks more strongly than to many an earlier generation. All of this makes him an historical enigma. Why has he had such influence? What has made this man so influential that he not only lives on in Christian homes and among our children as if he were a personal acquaintance but also—and this is perhaps most amazing of all—among scholars of literature?

It must surely be this: his poetic artistry, the imagery of his words, the man's wholeness and integrity which still can be felt. With Paul Gerhardt everything rings true. But here we discover something else. Here, in Paul Gerhardt, is expressed that which is rudimentary in our faith. To be sure, it is not expressed—as is often the case with the testimony of the Reformation—in the paradoxical dialectic of *Leben und Erleben*, life and experience, or of man and his worth, but

rather in marvelous unity. Mankind, whose sin and wretchedness Paul Gerhardt truly knew, is uplifted and elevated to sonship, raised to the very heights of blessedness. That which is elemental to faith is here perceptibly joined with that which is elementary in human existence: evening and morning, summer and winter, sorrow and joy, birth and death—and eternity. It is our world—and our life—because this same elemental quality traverses and undergirds our life.

In a manner resembling that of Matthias Claudius a century and a half after him, Paul Gerhardt's significance does not rest on any subtle performance or in any transcending of human existence, but precisely in the simple life, in the plainness of that which is elemental, in which we all have a part and which he, in his Christian poetry, elevates to classic standing.

This poet of the seventeenth century who presents himself to us in his ecclesiastical struggles as a man of the old orthodoxy was secretly and uncannily modern. Certainly he was not himself aware of this, nor did he even want to be. And yet he could not otherwise have anticipated all later generations in their songs, their prayers, their joys, the expression of their cares, and above all in their testimony to the certainty of their faith.

Book Reviews and Notices¹

Christian Faith and the Liberal Arts. Edited by Harold H. Ditmanson, Howard V. Hong, and Warren A. Quanbeck. Minneapolis: Augsburg Publishing House, 1960. 280 pages. \$4.95.

A committee is an unlikely source for a book worth reading. This is an exception. Since fifteen authors have contributed to the volume, no one reader is apt to endorse all views presented, but the collection is worth the attention of all interested in the church's role in higher education and all who need to be informed on the subject. The incentive for the project was provided by a meeting in 1950 of the Association of Lutheran College Faculties which considered the question, "Is there a Lutheran philosophy of higher education?" The work was continued by an informal committee which included, over the years, 25 representatives of six Lutheran colleges. Eleven of these participants contributed to the volume, plus four invited to submit essays on teaching fields not represented on the committee.

The general subject is considered under three main headings, "Presuppositions," "Structures," and "Implementation." The first section deals with the historical development of the "liberal arts," the theological basis, and the nature of man—all in relation to Christian higher education. The second section includes discussions of the Christian teacher, college administration, and the curriculum. The third section offers eleven essays by representatives of as many teaching fields concerning the role of these subjects in a Christian liberal arts college.

Professors Quanbeck and Hong give clear, lucid statements on the theological presuppositions of Christian higher education. The clarity of Quanbeck's writing prompts the wish that he had dealt directly with the application of these presuppositions to the task of the educator. The main strength of Hong's statement lies in his survey of the historical development of man's thought about man. There can be no doubt about

the legitimacy of his contention that anthropological questions are of central importance for higher education. It is unfortunate that he did not direct more attention to contemporary writings since the book is intended to speak to the needs of liberal education *today*. His resolution of the problem of the secularization of man does not speak adequately to contemporary analyses of the "human predicament." Here, and elsewhere in this volume, there is an implied rejection of the soundness and helpfulness of any contemporary theological formulations.

Sidney Rand's discussion of college administration is eminently sane and at the same time more radical than is apt to be recognized by those outside educational circles. His statement that "the faculty has the responsibility for and therefore should share in the determination of college policy" (p. 79) needs to be widely heard. To many, this view will sound commonplace. In theory it probably is, but in practice it points to one of the crucial problems in college administration—the locating of responsibility. Rand recognizes that problems in this area spring from the patterning of college organization after business models with the resulting "relegation of faculty members to the role of hired servants rather than a retention of their proper status as co-proprietors of the college . . ." (p. 79). College administration should be planned according to the unique educational function of the institution.

The statements on implementation vary considerably in their focus. The discussions of language studies and music are mainly concerned with justifying the place of these studies in a liberal arts curriculum. The chapters on sociology and psychology attempt to describe approaches to these disciplines that can be constructively related to the Christian faith against the background of prominent emphases in both fields that

1 Books reviewed or noticed in these pages may be purchased through your church's publication house.

have been clearly antithetical to Christianity. Both presentations are cogently stated and show good theological insight. Prof. Paulson writes winsomely about the study of literature but his conclusion regarding its relevance to things Christian is weak, namely, that "literature and the teachings of Christianity come to the same conclusion: *Man is a child of God, created by God, and apart from God he is nothing*" (p. 161). This is clearly at odds with statements of other contributors regarding the nature of revelation and man's rational capacities. Prof. Bailey, who writes on natural science, seems unaware of his own selective approach—or at least what is involved in such an approach—when he rejects the "young" earth concept, clearly implied in the biblical writings, because it conflicts with scientific knowledge, but accepts miracles in general and certain ones in particular. Such selectivity makes the *principle* of selection of crucial importance. His appeal to the argument from design (p. 223) is a weak point, and he is hardly consistent when he rejects the "neutralist conclusion," that is, "that the only contribution of science is . . . that it cannot be used against us" (p. 223), and then goes on to conclude: "The one thing we can say with certainty about science and religion is that the modern conviction that science cannot decide ultimates or give us a knowledge of ultimate reality will not change" (p. 223).

The volume does not offer an answer to the query that prompted the project: "Is there a Lutheran philosophy of higher education?" The Preface concedes this: "The committee would not be disposed to claim that what it here sets forth is a distinctively 'Lutheran' position. . . . But it would be fair to say that the point of view is broadly representative of the classical intellectual tradition of the Western church, qualified in important ways by Reformation concerns" (p. iv). This non-sectarian orientation is a definite asset of these essays—although the theological frame of reference is definitely Lutheran. If an effort were to be made to state a Lutheran view of higher education, Prof. Albert F. Wessen's concluding statement might well suggest the central thesis: "The ideals for which liberal education

strives require much of man—and of all people the Christian ought to have the necessary motivation. It is he who is to live a life of vocation in all that he does. It is he who is, in faith, free to enjoy life to the fullest. And because he is free in faith, he can be free to learn, to discriminate, and to utilize all of the truths that man has thus far discovered" (p. 243).

CARL FJELLMAN

The Word for This Century. Edited by Merrill C. Tenney. New York: Oxford University Press, 1960. 184 pages. \$4.00.

This volume has been prepared for the centennial of Wheaton College. Eight men contributed essays on key areas of the Christian faith, such as sin, the Bible, Christ, the church, and Christian ethics. Among the contributors are such well-known "evangelicals" as Billy Graham, Carl F. H. Henry, and V. Raymond Edman.

The tradition of Wheaton College is firmly imbedded in what its friends call "evangelical Christianity," sometimes also known as "Fundamentalism." The statement of faith adopted by the college in 1926 expresses the Christian faith in terms of such concepts as a verbally inspired Bible, conversion of persons at the age of "moral responsibility," and the premillennial return of Christ.

The tone of the book is more positive and less in the "crusading" vein than was characteristic of writers of this school in the recent past. The authors are not unlettered men; their essays show a wide and real acquaintance with contemporary theological developments and an understanding of present-day world events. There remains throughout the book, however, an almost naive repetition of many of the favorite concepts of Fundamentalism, giving the reader the impression that their mere repetition may cause them more surely to be believed.

Lutherans will appreciate the essentially biblical character of most of what is written here. The emphasis on the reality and seriousness of sin, the authority of the Bible, the all-sufficient atoning work of Christ will find an affirmative response in the hearts and minds of all who share a truly evangelical faith. It is commendable that the anniversary of a Christian college is cele-

brated by a publication which lends both clarity and permanence to the witness which such a college makes in our day.

But in the academic world of which Wheaton is a part, it would have been desirable to have found such a commemorative volume to have dealt more directly and realistically with the truly basic issues which are at the heart of the academic task today. How is the Christian faith related to human history? Where and how does the Gospel become relevant in the various academic disciplines? Is the Christian faith an integrating factor in intellectual endeavor or is it simply one area of study among many?

SIDNEY A. RAND

Church Music and Theology. By Erik Routley. Philadelphia: Muhlenberg Press, 1960. 120 pages. \$2.25.

Trained musicians have very little trouble in agreeing on what church music is good and what is shoddy. But they (and other lovers of good church music) find it very difficult to explain their preferences to others.

Can you prove to someone else that a certain hymn tune, a certain anthem, a certain solo is really sub-standard (in spite of its popularity)? Can you demonstrate from commonly accepted rules of Christian behavior that they are unfit for Christian worship? Can you suggest the elements inherent in the Gospel which demand a better style of music? In other words, is it possible to deduce moral rules for church music as for other fields of human endeavor? Ecclesiastical and theological commissions have often endeavored to do so. But Dr. Routley, equally well versed in church music and theology, disputes their musical moralizing in this his latest book. For an example he quotes from the report of the Archbishop's Committee, *Music in Church* (1951), that "music in keeping with the spirit of the liturgy should be characterized by qualities of nobility and restraint, freedom from sensationalism and mawkishness and from all suggestions of secularity," and proceeds to show convincingly that not all church music should or can be noble and dignified, but that it may often be playful and that (e.g., in the carols) the secular has a legitimate place in the church.

For a better standard he examines the moral demands of the Bible. Underlying all biblical ethics he finds two basic principles (1) the modesty of restraining oneself and denying one's pride and vanity and (2) the grace of going beyond the letter of the law. Applied to church music these standards imply that the composer or musician, writing or performing church music, should avoid the vanity of writing to please the listener (as also the supercilious vanity of wanting to shock him). He should (in the words of Thomas Aquinas) seek integrity, proportion, and clarity. But even to accomplish the beautiful cannot be his aim. He dare not "snatch at the beautiful," for beauty can only be a by-product which will fall into his lap if he is a good and honest craftsman. Routley proceeds to show how and why Romanticism falls short of these standards (it is an *Ersatz* eschatology), how they were ideally fulfilled in the work and artistic philosophy of J. S. Bach, and how they apply to different fields and forms of contemporary church music.

It remains for us to ask whether the author is free of the kind of musical moralizing which he condemns in others. Is it accidental that the mark of "restraint" which he criticizes in the Archbishop's report is basic also for his own canons? The archbishops warn against "sensationalism" and Routley against the "craving for attractiveness." Are these two not closely related? One might ask if a creative musician would not find Routley's standards as restrictive and unrealistic as the ones which he rejects. Like any other artist he might find it impossible to create and perform without a kind of passion, a seemingly egocentric self-realization that is not quite in line with the Sermon on the Mount. In other words, might it not be said that music is one of the vocations which must remain in a paradoxical tension with the Gospel? This is not the place to answer these questions. At any rate they do not alter the fact that Routley's comments and criticisms of church music provide a deep insight and sound knowledge of the subject in all its ramifications. Lutherans will note that he rejects the extremely slow *tempi* which Vaughan Williams in the English Hymnal had proposed for the Lutheran chorales. Routley approves a keener appre-

ciation of the earthy, "secular" style of the classical Lutheran chorale than is found in most English textbooks.

ULRICH S. LEUPOLD

The Singing Church. By Edwin Liemohn. Wartburg Press: Columbus, Ohio, 1959. 122 pages. \$2.50.

According to its author this is an attempt to trace the role of the congregation in the musical part of the service. "The emphasis has been on pointing out progress toward congregational hymn singing as known in most churches today." In the process the book has become a history of the hymn with brief accounts of the principal types of hymns and of important hymn writers and hymnbooks. Valuable are also the numerous citations on hymns and hymn singing by clerics and critics from age to age. This reviewer found the chapters on English, Scandinavian, and American hymnody most informative and dependable.

The material in the first three chapters is not too well arranged, so that the author is led into some contradictions and inconsistencies. E.g., the citation from Chrysostom on p. 10 (and others not quoted) disprove the author's contention on p. 11 that the people did not sing in the fourth century.

Authorities on plain chant credit Ambrose with several melodies to his hymns, e.g., *Aeternae Rerum Conditor*. It is misleading when the author says on p. 16 that Ambrose introduced antiphonal singing. Pages 11 and 19 show that it was much earlier. It should also be noted that the antiphon before a psalm or canticle is—in spite of its name—not performed antiphonally. When the author says (p. 19), "this process of relieving the congregation of hymn singing was completed by the close of the fourth century," he sets the date unduly early. It was only in the middle of the fourth century that Ambrose introduced congregational hymns. And congregational participation does not seem to have declined seriously until the church spread beyond the reach of the Latin language. On p. 26 the author equates portative and regal; but a regal is a reed organ, while a portative is a pipe organ. On p. 33 the author equates *leise* and *leich*, but a *leise* is a sacred folk song ending in "Kyrie

eleison," while a *leich* (for French *lays*) is a sequence-like song, either secular or sacred. The oldest Lutheran hymnal for congregational singing is not from 1529, but from 1523 or 1524, the so-called *Achtniederbuch*.

These corrections do not alter the fact that the author has garnered relevant facts from many books (the bibliography names 87 works) and helped to fill the need for more popular works on the music of the hymn.

ULRICH S. LEUPOLD

Music and Worship in the Church. By Austin C. Lovelace and William C. Rice. Nashville: Abingdon Press, 1960. 220 pages. \$4.00.

This is a "how to" book. It shows ways and means of organizing the music in a local congregation. Its twelve chapters outline the functions of the pastor, congregation, and choir director, the choirs, soloists, church schools, and the music and worship committees. Graded lists of hymns, anthems, and solos, a glossary of musical and liturgical terms, and an extensive classified bibliography complete the book.

Of the two men responsible for this book, Dr. Lovelace is professor of Church Music at Garrett Biblical Institute and a well known composer of anthems and Dr. Rice heads the Department of Music at Baker University, Baldwin, Kansas. Both men also serve as ministers of music in Methodist churches. But the book itself betrays no one-sided denominational bias. One need not agree with every view expressed. But on the whole the suggestions put forward are so practical and sane that with little or no change they could be put in effect in a Lutheran or any other Christian church. This book should be in the hands of every pastor, choir director, or church trustee who would like to develop a full musical program in his church. It will prove to be a mine of information, inspiration, and helpful ideas.

ULRICH S. LEUPOLD

The Incarnation. By Bjarne Skard. Minneapolis: Augsburg Publishing House, 1960. 184 pages. \$3.50.

The answer which the church during the first five centuries of its existence worked

out to the question, "What think ye of Christ?" is not only of basic historical concern but continues to be a matter of life-and-death importance for its faith. Here the bishop of Tunsberg, recognized as Norway's leading patristic scholar, grapples directly with this central dogma in a book which combines authoritative scholarship with vital witness. It is a study of the Apostles', Nicene, and Athanasian Creeds, complemented with chapters on the Logos Christology and the Creed of Chalcedon.

The various answers which the church judged to be inadequate are all clearly delineated and carefully evaluated. The reader is held in the grip of a suspense drama as one group after another rises to challenge the faith by which the church lives. The Docetes and Ebionites, Modalists and Adoptionists, Apollinarists and Arians, Monophysites and Nestorians all come vividly alive and proceed to hear their doom. In spite of the good intentions of those who seek to lift the veil of the mystery and to resolve the tension of the paradox, the church clings tenaciously to the revealed truth that the man Jesus of Nazareth is God incarnate.

The author makes it clear that the starting point for the "Christ dogma" is not to be sought in the Creeds themselves nor in their historical and conceptual backgrounds but in the revealed Word of God. It is regrettable that he does not give an explicit definition of the Word itself. On the one hand, he lays great stress on Christ as the Word. "The entire history of the Christ dogma is the history of the interpretation of this Biblical pronouncement: The Word became flesh" (p. 7). On the other hand, he implicitly identifies the Word with Scripture, for in asserting that the dogma is based on the Word he proceeds to speak about text and canon and to point out that the struggle to preserve pure doctrine "synchronizes" with the struggle to retain pure Scripture" (p. 4). The fundamentalistic tendency is reinforced by the sequence in which the biblical witness is presented. Disregarding historical criticism, the author begins with John and then goes on to Hebrews, Paul, and the Synoptics in that order. It is obvious, however, that he is not a genuine fundamentalist. Instead of seeking to prove the deity of Christ by

means of Scripture he affirms at the start that "the beginning of the Christ dogma is found in *axiomatic truth*, but this truth is a *person*" (p. 3) and states at the end that "Scripture has its *status duplex*, being both the Word of God and the word of men," issuing a warning against "Monophysitic Bible-glorification" (pp. 178-179).

The structure of the book is well illustrated by a military figure of speech used by the author. To defend its faith in Christ as true God and true man the church first erects a small citadel, the central donjon, the *Apostolicum*, then an inner court, the *Nicenum*, and finally the outer fortifications, the *Athanasium*. The purpose of the whole construction is a defense in two directions. To the right is a heretical overemphasis on the divinity of Christ, represented by the Docetists, the Modalists, the Apollinarists, and the Monophysites. To the left is an overemphasis on the humanity of Christ, represented by the Ebionites, the Adoptionists, the Arians, and the Nestorians. Christological heresy is still limited to the two fundamental forms. Guided by the "mystical realism" of revelation and spurning rational speculation, the church must continue to walk the middle road between the dangerous oversimplifications on either side. Theologically the two-nature pronouncement of Chalcedon remains "the final settlement." But in the life of the church the ancient Creeds are not so much conceptual formulations as hymns of adoration of the "very God of very God" who "for us men and for our salvation came down from heaven and was incarnate . . . and made man."

This is a fascinating book to read. Although it is thoroughly documented from first-hand sources and abounds in Greek and Latin (conveniently translated), even a theological novice can read it with understanding and profit. The author gets his thought across by using such imagery as the following: "With the rightist deviation there is, as it were, a flame of lightning which never strikes the earth, and with the leftist deviation that of a volcanic eruption reaching only atmospheric heights" (p. 40). The book teems with insights not only into forms of thought but also into human beings back of them. Wrong doctrine is exposed and con-

demned without compromise, but even the erring are treated with fairness and sympathy. The reader is grateful that the author has the heart of a bishop as well as the mind of a scholar.

Herman Jorgensen has performed well the difficult task of translation. Now and then, however, he is so engrossed in the original that the English style carries a Norwegian imprint, as when "demarcation" becomes "demarkation" and "ousia" is rendered "usia."

This is a book which should be required reading for pastors and seminarians and which may be wholeheartedly recommended to inquiring laymen.

T. A. KANTONEN

Luther's Works. Volume 51: Sermons, I. Translated by John W. Doberstein. Edited by Helmut L. Lehmann. Philadelphia: Muhlenberg Press, 1959. 392 pages. \$5.00.

A total of 43 of the more than 2,000 extant sermons of Luther are here offered, arranged in chronological order. As the translator freely admits, selection is a difficult and in the final analysis an arbitrary matter in such a case. In the opinion of this reviewer, however, a commendably representative choice was made. We find here, for example, Luther's first (extant) sermon from 1510 or 1512, as well as his last, preached on February 15, 1546. There are also Lenten sermons and catechetical sermons, a Baptism sermon and some funeral sermons, a Christmas sermon, a sermon on "Soberness and Moderation against Gluttony and Drunkenness," and so forth. The selection covers a lot of ground, both historically and doctrinally.

Of special interest to this reviewer were the three sermons included in this anthology which were based on the same text and presented at different times in the Reformer's career. The text is Matt. 11:25-30 ("Father, thou hast hidden these things from the wise and understanding, and hast revealed them to babes," etc.). The first of these sermons was preached early in 1517, about nine months before the posting of the 95 Theses. At this time Luther was beginning to express his concern over the sale of indulgences. "Through these nothing is accomplished ex-

cept that the people learn to fear and flee and dread the penalty of sins, but not the sins themselves." He is quite polite in his denunciations here, going no further than to admonish "you snoring priests" and to exclaim, "How secure we all are in the midst of all our evils!" Twenty-nine years later, however, in his very last sermon, Luther was much bolder in his criticisms of the "evils" which he had begun to perceive earlier. Here we find that the pope ("the decoy duck in Rome") is scoffed at with great gusto: "the devil so puffs him up that he imagines that whatever he says is pure divine wisdom and everybody must accept and obey it. . . ." The papal decretals are tossed off as the pope's "big fool's book." Nor do the sectarians fare much better; they, too, are "wiseacres" who corrupted the "wisdom and understanding" which Luther found in the Scriptures. In the second of these three sermons, preached during the time of the Peasants' War, Luther is milder even than he was in 1517; this sermon is more properly exegetical than are the other two.

But taken by and large, these sermons are all typically Luther; they are earthy, personal, generously interlarded with Scripture, filled with constant references to the age in which he lived and to the battles he had to fight. The challenge and the comfort of the Gospel abounds; the person of Christ is held aloft for all to see; the desired response of faith is set forth in no uncertain terms. These sermons are not the calling card of a meretricious, sycophantic aesthete. Luther *might* have been more sophisticated, presumably, but he was too straightforward, too much concerned with his auditors' welfare to launch forth into pretty and impractical homiletical discourses. Here we find the Word of God discussed in pungent, this-is-for-you terms. If the sermons Luther preached were not always stylistically logical in all respects, they certainly must have made a profound impression upon his hearers. His was the kind of preaching which demands and elicits a response.

Today, in what might be called another "gospel-glutted age" (Vernon Parrington used this term to describe seventeenth century New England), the glamour of preaching has been somewhat tarnished. As a re-

sult, new techniques are being suggested and tried, with varying degrees of success. In the midst of this often frantic and frequently futile search, it is well to call to mind the style of the good Doctor of Wittenberg. Many could do much worse; few can do much better.

GENE LUND

Luther's Works. Volume 9: Lectures on Deuteronomy. Translated by Richard R. Caemmerer. Edited by Jaroslav Pelikan. St. Louis: Concordia Publishing House, 1960. 533 pages. \$6.00.

As the volumes in the new American edition of Luther's works multiply to fill a bookshelf, some readers are probably beginning to wonder whether it will ever be possible to read all of them. *Lectures on Deuteronomy* deserves attention because it illustrates particularly well the reformer's exegetical method, and because the interpretation sparkles with surprising pertinence.

Though Luther reveals his interest in and knowledge of textual and linguistic data, he does not deal with such matters extensively. He knows that the Septuagint referred to the Red Sea where the Hebrew text had a sea full of reeds, but he does not worry about the difference. He takes time to clarify the references to other places, and to peoples, to the extent of indicating his disagreement with Jerome and other interpreters. He analyzes Hebrew words and grammar, generally to good purpose, but sometimes without complete accuracy, as when he says *guchim* is that by which we are set in order toward God in contrast to *mishpatim* which is order toward man.

Modern critical scholarship would agree with some, disagree with others of the reformer's conclusions. A modern commentary could scarcely omit reference to Josiah's reform (II Kings 22-23) as Luther does. On the other hand, he divides Deuteronomy in a way that in general corresponds to the modern outline. He senses the introductory nature of the first four chapters and distinguishes between the historical summary of chapters 1-3 and the exhortation in chapter 4. He comprehends the unity of chapters 5-11 and 12-26, also the desultory nature of the concluding chapters. Though he is unbothered

by the minutiae of modern literary criticism, he sees the conflicts between historical accounts in Deuteronomy and Exodus, but strains to harmonize them as much as some moderns strive to exaggerate their diversity. When he describes the style of Deuteronomy, modern readers would agree as he writes, "It is certainly an extensive exhortation and . . . a wordy one." Then he adds his own exhortation/ with which more widespread agreement should be wished, "It is for us to restrain the feeling of boredom, for we know that it is the words of God that we hear."

As would be expected, Luther's major contribution to the interpretation of Deuteronomy is theological. And as usual, his teaching penetrates living situations to escape the abstractions of recluse scholarship. Though his own struggles with the papacy and the *Schwaermer* are reflected, such references do not overburden, or rather disrupt, this commentary as they do some of the Reformation writings. Since the exchange with Erasmus was in process when the commentary was published, there is frequent discourse on freedom of the will along with the usual emphasis upon the word and faith.

Naturally, the Law provides a major topic, and as might be expected, Luther takes the viewpoint of Paul. He sees the nature of the Law demonstrated in the declaration that the people "could not endure the voice of God." Although the Deuteronomic affirmation of law is neglected to some extent, Luther does develop the role of law in community life, and contributes practical insight about civil administration and problems of justice. It shows Luther's concern that his society should learn from the Old Testament ethic. If the reformer did not here relate the theological with the civil function of law as explicitly as might be desired, he does distinguish the two and writes with fundamental clarity about both. He summarizes the contents of Deuteronomy as "a most ample and excellent explanation of the Decalog."

Neither Luther's genius nor his religious experience could free him from some of the limitations of his age. He still adds an allegorical interpretation to several chapters. In identifying Christ with the prophet like Moses (ch. 18), the reformer arrives at his goal by some questionable pathos. In most of the commentary, however, he perceives in

the ancient situation something that corresponds to the perpetual condition of men. For such an understanding he was indebted to the Bible as a whole, a fact which he shows by frequent citations, especially from Psalms and Romans. Although Luther may have fallen short of what modern scholarship knows about the "situation in life" (meaning actually the "situation in culture"), few commentators have been able to elucidate so well the *situation in faith*. Anyone who wishes to study Deuteronomy for its meaning to the life of faith will not find a better help than Luther's lectures.

The commentary was first published in Latin in 1525, after preparations scattered through more than two years. Some of the Latin transliterations of biblical names will appear strange to readers accustomed to Protestant editions of the English Bible. In printing chapters of Deuteronomy, however, the Revised Standard Version has usually been followed. The translator has caught the directness of Luther's style and the depth of his meaning. Consequently, the volume provides easy yet profound reading.

ROBERT J. MARSHALL

Parents of Many. By Victor E. Swenson. Rock Island: Augustana Press, 1959. 348 pages. \$3.75.

This book is a personal narrative by an Augustana missionary couple of "forty-five years as missionaries in old, new, and divided China." The connecting thread running through the narrative consists of the deeds and happenings in the life of missionary Swenson and his wife, together with the impressions and perspectives which these evoked. The background is supplied by the sweeping changes and political upheavals in China which pass in kaleidoscopic review. The human background is given in the form of intimate reminiscences of a few devoted Chinese Christians, outstanding converts, secular officials, and the like. The existence of a growing Chinese Christian community is hinted at but is obviously not the main concern of the narrative. Institutional and organizational details concerning the work are subordinated to human touches. What emerges is the portrait of a devoted missionary couple whose career virtually co-

incided with the revolutionary period in China's history. Not the least of the merits of the book is the authentically Chinese flavor which characterizes its descriptions. The reader is always conscious that the events related could have happened nowhere but in China.

Dedicated to Chinese and foreign fellow laborers for the Gospel in China, the book belongs to a category of Christian literature dealing with the lives of saints and martyrs. Such literature usually has the effect of inspiring a similar courage and devotion in the reader, and the present narrative succeeds well in that respect. From the standpoint of objective church history, however, it leaves much to be desired. Apart from the reminiscences of the narrator and his wife, who are the chief subjects, there is very little objective continuity to the story. Only their presence keeps the story from being a series of charming anecdotes. This need not deter those interested in reading an otherwise valuable missionary book.

JAMES A. SCHERER

Notebook of a Colonial Clergyman. Edited by Theodore G. Tappert and John W. Doberstein. Philadelphia: Muhlenberg Press, 1959. 250 pages. \$3.50.

Henry Melchior Muhlenberg came to America from Halle in 1742. He kept a day book until the year of his death in 1787. Written in German, the manuscript books have been collected, translated, edited, and published by Tappert and Doberstein in a three volume work (Muhlenberg Press, 1942, 1945, 1958) under the title *The Journals of Henry Melchior Muhlenberg*. From the 4,502 columns of that work the same authors have produced a selection that fills close to 250 pages, one-twentieth of the original.

The principle of selection is described as a choice of "only a few of the author's observations and reflections which will furnish intimate glimpses into the life and manners of American colonists in the eighteenth century." Twenty-six of the forty-six years are represented, with varying amounts of material. Months and even years intervene between entries, so that continuity is not maintained. Yet we can get a fair idea of the

times and places in which Muhlenberg carried out his significant ministry.

The entries which are given afford us a view of the physical discomforts this frontier ministry imposed, and of the ability of Muhlenberg to minister both to body and spirit. They give us the background of the other churches and ministers who held the patriarch in high regard—the Swedish churches, Dr. Wrangel, the Episcopal church, the Methodist Whitefield, the Presbyterians. Muhlenberg does not set the Quakers on any pedestal, being impressed more by their business acumen than by their pacifism. Conditions among the Georgia Lutherans are suggested by the entries on his trip to Ebenezer.

Evidently the editors have sought to give considerable attention to the parts of the Journal which report conditions in and around Philadelphia during the years of the Revolution. But there are also hints of the social and educational activities of the city and of Muhlenberg's amused attitude toward the American Philosophical Society, and toward the Academy (later the University of Pennsylvania) in awarding honorary degrees to the German ministers. The sons of Muhlenberg had no support from the father in their political ambitions.

From the book there emerges the picture of a God-fearing, devoted, sacrificial pastor who is single-minded in his aim to bring the scattered German Lutherans together in a truly confessional church, tinged indeed by pietism, but centering its emphasis on the Word and will of God.

A measure of the value of the volume is the desire it inspires in the reader to go to the larger work for a fuller revelation of Henry Melchior Muhlenberg and a more complete record of his planting of the church in the new world.

CONRAD BERGENDOFF

Brothers of the Faith. By Stephen Neill. Nashville: Abingdon Press, 1960. 192 pages. \$4.00.

The subtitle of this book, "the story of men who have worked for Christian unity," indicates both its content and its method. Bishop Neill here presents the "inside" story of the development of the ecumenical move-

ment since 1910. He does it not by recounting objective historical facts or citing official documents but by drawing intimate and vivid pictures of many of the men who have played the most important roles in the ecumenical drama. The author is in unique position to do so. For thirty-five years he has himself taken active part in the effort toward church unity and served formerly as associate general secretary of the World Council of Churches. Thus his portrayal of "the brothers of the faith" is based to a large degree upon personal recollections.

Across the pages of this book marches an imposing array of the saints of yesterday: Mott, Söderblom, Brent, Azariah, Germanos, Temple, Paton, Bell, Bonhoeffer. They are joined by such present-day figures as J. H. Oldham, Visser 't Hooft, Oxnam, Kraemer, Newbigin, Niles, and Fry. This is a human interest story of the first order. Under the magic wand of Bishop Neill's pen his characters come throbbingly alive. They are more than mere types representing the manifold traditions of the World Council of Churches. The reader learns to know each man as a man who makes his own contribution toward the unity and the renewal of the church by being true to himself and his calling.

One could only wish that the gallery of portraits were more complete. Berggrav and William Adams Brown receive only passing notice, while Archbishop Brilioth is not even mentioned. The last omission stems from the fact that the author's interest is in "Life and Work" rather than in "Faith and Order." Bishop Brent and the Lausanne Conference receive adequate attention, and some quotations from the Report of the Edinburgh Conference of 1937 are given in the chapter on Temple, but the Lund Conference of 1952 is ignored altogether.

In spite of its limitations, this is a book which no one interested in the ecumenical movement can afford to ignore. Particularly valuable is the insight which it affords into the pioneering work of men like Bishop Azariah of India and Orthodox Archbishop Germanos who are almost unknown to most American churchmen. Equally important is the service which it renders in bringing to life such influential leaders as Söderblom and Temple, towering figures of the im-

mediate past who are fast becoming mere names to the present generation.

The cause of ecumenicity, as everyone who has had a share in it knows, is advanced fully as much by personal contacts as by impersonal pronouncements. The walls of distrust crumble as Christians come to know one another and learn to respect the sincerity of one another's motives. Bishop Neill's book captures this ecumenical spirit in all its vitality and warmth. It shows how brothers in Christ can speak the truth to another in love as they seek to overcome their differences. The author captivates the reader with the winsomeness of his presentation and his unfailing good humor. But the reader also senses throughout a profound reverence for the truth of the Gospel and a wholehearted consecration to the church's missionary task, which furnished the original impulse for the ecumenical movement. The keynote of the book is sounded in Archbishop Temple's words, "If the gospel is true for any man anywhere, it is true for all men everywhere." This is a timely emphasis as Christendom celebrates the fiftieth anniversary of the Edinburgh World Missionary Conference and anticipates the next step forward in ecumenicity, the integration of the International Missionary Council with the World Council of Churches at New Delhi.

T. A. KANTONEN

Sandals at the Mosque: Christian Presence Amid Islam. By Kenneth Cragg. New York: Oxford University Press, 1959. 160 pages. \$2.75.

This book can be read with equal effect as a Christian interpretation of Islam or as a Muslim's introduction to Christianity. The fact indicates the author's singular capacity for bridging the gaps between two traditionally irreconcilable thought worlds. Though modest in size, the volume is compelling in impact and packed with ripe theological wisdom. The approach is far from a detached scholastic analysis which condemns and criticizes from a comfortable objectivity. Cragg's thought pattern grows out of immersion in the human situation of Muslim-Christian confrontation and co-existence. He argues that "men are more and more walking in a world of like predicament

and mutual involvement" (p. 19). In this world where "none are outsiders to humanity and the God with whom we have to do," the Muslim's self-understanding is examined from within the circle of Christian revelation. The resulting thesis sheds considerable light on the essential characteristics of Christianity as well as on the nature of Islam.

The book's sub-title, "Christian Presence Amid Islam," is an accurate index of the approach taken. The concern is with the fulfillment of the church's active life in the world, involving evangelism, witness, and service. Polemics and the definition of theological formulae have been passed by. By comparison with the discussion in international missionary circles in 1938 (Tambaram Conference), when syncretism was the crucial problem, Cragg moves the discussion to a more mature level. The relation between Christian revelation and Muslim faith cannot be stated simply in terms of "total discontinuity" after the fashion of Hendrik Kraemer. For Cragg this is too simple a formulation. The task demands not mere assertion of difference, but a new theological dimension: *presence*. Without surrendering loyalty to the Gospel, the Christian is called to "take off his shoes" in the presence of the Muslim who stands outside the circle of Christian revelation, but within the circle of a common humanity and God's redemptive purpose. Such theology may rightly be styled "frontier theology."

JAMES A. SCHERER

The Faith We Proclaim. By Elmer J. F. Arndt. Philadelphia: Christian Education Press, 1960. 135 pages. \$2.50.

The sub-title of this book summarizes its purpose and its contents: "The Doctrinal Viewpoint Generally Prevailing in the Evangelical and Reformed Church." The volume is the result of a decision made by that church in 1954 that a brief review of the "consensus of Christian thought" should be prepared in order to provide persons within and outside that immediate fellowship with a ready source of information concerning the status of theological belief and concern in the church.

The author is professor of Historical

Theology and Ethics at Eden Theological Seminary, and he wrote under the guidance of his denomination's Theological Committee. The committee is to be commended for its willingness to be "guide" rather than "author." The lucid prose of Dr. Arndt could not be matched by a committee of writers.

At first glance there is nothing special about this book. Its chapter titles go through the traditional subjects of "Bible," "Jesus," "God," "The Holy Spirit," "The Church and the Sacraments," "The Christian Understanding of Man," and "The Christian Life," after opening with two summary chapters on "The Spirit of the Evangelical and Reformed Church" and "The Mission and Message of the Church." But the first glance is deceiving. The book is a probing and profound but altogether clear and interestingly written treatment of the great central themes of Scripture.

It is the biblical faith which is exposed here. But there is nothing archaic about the language or form of presentation. Scripture is taken seriously as the Word of God. The redemptive work of God in Christ is seen as the central and encompassing truth of the Christian faith.

If the book has a failing, it is the fact that, except for a quite traditional treatment of sanctification, there is little explanation or suggestion of the relevance of the faith to contemporary problems. There is always the possibility, in a book such as this, that some reader who is unacquainted with the church will conclude that the Christian life consists in a private devotional life and a cozy community of worshiping people and will thus miss the reality of the church as the agent of God at work in a world which does not know him but should.

Having said this, let us still insist that this book is a pattern of the kind of writing which clergy and laymen alike can, and I am certain, will read to their profit.

SIDNEY A. RAND

A Roman Catholic in the White House. By James A. Pike (in collaboration with Richard Byfield). New York: Doubleday and Company, 1960. 143 pages. \$2.50.

No Protestant churchman is better qual-

ified to write on the subject of Roman Catholicism and the American presidency than the Episcopal bishop of California. Formerly a Roman Catholic and an attorney, James A. Pike is a prolific writer in social ethics, especially in the relationship between church and state and in the encounter between Roman and Protestant Christians on every level of national life. He has done his fellow Americans a service by discussing the "Roman Catholic issue" as it relates to the national election in 1960—first in public news media, then in a concise article in *Life* magazine in December, 1959, and now in these nine chapters.

Briefly, it is Pike's thesis that American Catholicism is shaped by two developments. The "official" Roman viewpoint, as expressed on the European scene by Cardinal Ottaviani, prohibits "error" a place in Catholic society, adheres to the "church-over-state" view wherever it is politically feasible, and then ignores both of these criteria whenever such is necessary, while maintaining them as final goals in Catholic strategy. The second is the "American interpretation" which wishes to see Rome adjust to living in the "competitive market" so familiar in modern religious pluralism and ignores the official language, not because it is expedient for the moment but because both the nation and the Roman hierarchy (it believes) would be better off in the long run if America's contribution to church life became part of the Roman Church's life as well.

The authors provide documentation showing that American Catholic prelates (e.g., Francis Connell in 1949 and John Ryan in 1959) have embraced the "official" position, and were this the only view offered, "it would be dangerous and entirely unfitting for any member of a Church proclaiming such views to become our Chief Executive." But the "American interpretation" also has strong documentation in the writings of Cardinal Gibbons, John Courtney Murray, *Commonweal* magazine, and all of the leading Roman Catholic political figures (e.g., Eugene McCarthy and John Kennedy). Unfortunately, the authors do not refer to the views of the first American bishop, John Carroll (d. 1815), or to the First Council of Baltimore (1852), both of which would have provided earlier documentation to the

"American interpretation." This discussion becomes complicated by difficulties such as Catholic practice in some areas of the world and by the unequivocal doctrine of papal infallibility.

At this point, the authors bring up several specific issues where the Catholic-Protestant alignment counts in legislation, such as federal aid to parochial education, diplomatic relations with the Vatican, and the foreign aid-birth control issue so recently in the headlines. In this latter issue, the public official who is more strongly criticized than any Roman Catholic layman is Dwight Eisenhower, whose nearly illiterate statement the authors find noticeably shaped by political motivations.

The chief value of this work is its attempt to place a framework around the current debate, insisting that questions be asked in the right way and in the right order. The authors have successfully argued against two popular suppositions. On the one hand, any compartmentalization which separates the "religious" from the "political" sphere (implied in Senator Kennedy's famous *Look* magazine article, but later refined and corrected by the senator in his speech of April 21, 1960—too late for publication in this book) misunderstands the unity of the whole human fabric. On the other hand, any final decision during an election must not be determined by an absolute stand on this issue alone (which the authors reject as "bigotry"), but must be guided by the exigencies and demands of the total political scene. The relative value of this issue alongside economic, military, and personality considerations is readily admitted. But the reader cannot fail to notice that the former supposition is stressed far more than the latter, revealing the bias out of which these authors write.

This bias is made more apparent as we read that the problem of the use or non-use of contraceptive devices is "a matter of grave international import." And at the close of the book the authors have described the recent exchange between Daniel Poling and Senator Kennedy concerning the dedication of the Chapel of the Four Chaplains in Philadelphia a decade ago. The importance of both of these specific issues is unreasonably emphasized when it is compared with the

more immediate, daily problems which confront the President.

As we conclude the book, we are left with some important problems aside from any minor criticisms: The authors seek to organize those questions to be asked of the *candidates* during 1960. Would it not be valuable to suggest somewhere that the questions should be rephrased and directed to the *Roman Church*—on the local and hierarchical levels—thus pointing out that this is not merely an election issue every four years, but a constant concern for informed discussion between Catholics and Protestants from neighborhood teas to episcopal councils? Are the authors justified in confirming the popular non-Catholic belief that the presidency is the place to "draw the line" (rather than the senate or the supreme court)? Have not they ignored the possibility that a Roman Catholic President in *some* issues (as John Bennett has pointed out) may be influenced in a way that could enhance our national conscience (e.g., in civil rights, social welfare, and the transcendence of "our National Purpose")? We might suggest that the line between church and state needs to be redrawn over and over again for each generation, and that even this sacrosanct New World principle is subject to the exigencies of our changing language and the crises of earthly demands. Should not these writers maintain some openness to this kind of flexibility or imagination?

Finally, we must ask whether these authors have not wrongly estimated the way Americans play politics. Perhaps Martin Marty was correct when he said in a recently reported address that the current debate has "a hollow ring" because it is being conducted on an ideological level. Are Americans interested in ideology, or do we not prefer the experience of "trial and error"? These authors have neglected this American philosophy. To be sure, the ideological debate must take place, and Pike and Byfield have done this debate a great service. But the debate should somewhere deal with the possibility that both sides may be ignored on election day—and then what shall we read after the first Roman Catholic has settled in the White House, in 1961 or soon thereafter?

ALBERT R. AHLSTROM

The New Translations of the Bible. By E. H. Robertson. Naperville, Ill.: Alec R. Alenson, Inc., 1959. 183 pages. \$2.50.

The twelfth in the series "*Studies in Ministry and Worship*" proposes to trace the history of the English and American versions of the Bible from the King James version of 1611 to the new translation which is nearing completion in Britain under the direction of C. H. Dodd and a Joint Committee established by the ecclesiastical authorities of the major denominations in England and Scotland.

The range and complexity of the subject might have produced a diffuse and tedious exposition, but Robertson has succeeded in writing a history which is both compendious and succinct. The reader is given the privilege of seeing at a glance the major problems and the great importance of the work of the Bible translator and what he has accomplished for the individual and the church.

Pastors and teachers will find this a helpful aid in guiding parishioners and students to a proper evaluation of the merits and deficiencies of the many versions—from the King James to James Moffatt, Edgar Goodspeed, J. M. Powis Smith, and J. B. Phillips, to mention a few.

NORMAN K. BAKKEN

Great Personalities of the Old Testament. By William Sanford LaSor. Westwood, N. J.: Fleming H. Revell Co., 1959. 192 pages. \$3.00.

The Old Testament professor at Fuller Seminary writes as an avowed conservative. He presents a somewhat revised version of addresses. This assures a simple, direct treatment, but results in a minimizing of scholarly problems. He says all the Old Testament was written before Ezra's death. He speaks well of "the revelation that God made to man in real-life situations." And he brings out effectively some of the religious values that lie in the experiences and activities of these characters. But such a study must necessarily be historical as well as religious. And one must raise serious questions concerning various features of the "history" he presents.

He contradicts himself when he puts

Hezekiah's accession in 716, and then says it was a few years later when Shalmaneser besieged Samaria (actually 724). And he wrongly says God commanded Moses to strike the rock; see Num. 20:8. He strangely speaks of Eli only as judge, seeming to ignore that he was priest. He says Ezra decided to rebuild the walls of Jerusalem, although the Bible says nothing of the sort.

Sometimes he seems somewhat confused in his efforts to follow the Bible verbatim and yet express various judgments. Thus he says Samuel finally knew he had anointed the wrong man; also that Saul was chosen on a "human basis"; but Saul was God's choice, I Sam. 9:15, 16.

Sometimes he inserts a footnote to deny some view he considers false. But he is totally silent on many critical problems. Thus he accepts Gen. 37:27, ignores verse 28. He accepts Num. 20:12, ignores Deut. 1:37; 3:26. He refuses to date Moses and the Exodus. Once he gives the edge to the thirteenth century, but more often seems to prefer the fifteenth. He makes no reference to modern scholarly opinion when he puts Ezra's coming before Nehemiah's, or when he ascribes the whole book of Isaiah to the eighth century prophet.

Even some of his moral judgments are very dubious. He seems to defend Ruth's brazen effort to throw herself sexually at Boaz. He tries to defend the policy of exterminating the Canaanites—though he says nothing about the special problem involved in slaughtering their babies—and he condemns Joshua because he did not always actually "carry out the will of God in that respect."

HAROLD L. CREAGER

Love and Conflict. By Gibson Winter. New York: Doubleday and Company, Inc., 1958. 191 pages. \$3.50.

This book is unique among publications in the area of marriage and the family. When the orientation of so many authors in this field is statistically descriptive and value-free, Gibson Winter of the Federated Theological Faculty of the University of Chicago, writing with skill and insight, has produced a book which is normative and value-loaded. With a biblical interpretation of family and

community life, he places the social changes currently affecting family life under the judgment of biblical norms.

In this description of today's marital adjustment and changing patterns of child rearing, the author introduces such intriguing concepts as "shrinking man," "yardstick rearing," "flight from intimacy," and "make-believe marriage." The study will stimulate much constructive thinking on the part of young adults in the church and all those involved in the intimate relationships of the developmental American family of mid-twentieth century.

WADE F. HOOK

The Nurture and Evangelism of Children.

By Gideon G. Yoder. Scottsdale, Pa.: Herald Press, 1959. 188 pages. \$3.00.

Book titles may often be misleading and at the same time a dead giveaway. At least so it seems to be with this volume of the 1959 Conrad Grebel Lectures, a lectureship set up to encourage Mennonite scholars to engage in intensive study on topics of timely interest to the Mennonite Church. The misleading aspect of the title lies in its broad connotations that promise a wider treatment than simply a discussion of the problem of Baptism and its implications for Christian education and decision. The title is a dead giveaway in its utter transparency as to the author's view of the relationship between nurture and evangelism, a view necessarily in harmony with his own Mennonite persuasion as well as that of a large segment of Protestantism.

The author's concern is primarily with the Christian education and evangelization of children within the Christian community. His chief purpose is to deal with the problem from the standpoint of believers' Baptism, but not in such a way as to be critical of the churches that practice infant Baptism. His mood thus is kindly, but his conclusions are nevertheless strongly consistent with his own confessional stand. For his own denomination he presents a logical treatment, saying very much what he was expected to say. Briefly, nurture in a subtle way precedes evangelism; and both precede Baptism. One is left to wonder about the effective movement of God's action and the force of divine grace in the

experience of coming to Christ. One misses the *didache* and *kerygma* in their New Testament sense as contributing to the focus for understanding the issues involved. Nevertheless, the author has made a scholarly contribution toward understanding the forces that make for conservative Christian education.

PAUL M. LINDBERG

The Psychology of Christian Conversion. By Robert O. Ferm. New York: Fleming H. Revell Company, 1959. 255 pages. \$4.00.

The religious atmosphere of our day, particularly surrounding the problem of conversion, calls for a thoroughgoing study of the kind attempted by this author. A swing away from the crisis conversion era, yet a new return as manifested in the Billy Graham crusades, makes the study a timely one. A new religious orientation in the whole field of psychology, together with an obvious secularization and depersonalization of life among the masses, suggest a paradox that needs to be investigated by religious scholars. Dr. Ferm, who is dean of students and professor of history at Houghton College, has assembled data that should be helpful to those who want to understand the deeper dimensions of the conversion problem. In exploring the broad waterfront of the problem, and even while holding strongly to his own subjective views, he has succeeded in bringing together his data in a factual and objective manner.

Dr. Ferm rightfully distinguishes very carefully the psychological and the religious as well as the Christian and the religious. The Christian evangelical crisis is one thing; the broadly religious crisis experience is another. The uniqueness of the Christian experience cannot be discovered by means of the psychological method. Psychology as a science can only be descriptive of what it sees; it cannot by its scientific method discover the essence of the Christian experience. The uniqueness of the evangelical crisis "lies in the redemptive conception." It finds its nature in the faith which at the same time is a "subjective commitment to Christ and a rational belief in certain historically grounded facts: the death and the resurrection of Jesus

Christ" (p. 212). Such careful distinctions as these must be made if the Christian concepts are not to be watered down into the broad understandings of a common denominator religion.

Psychologists have given and are giving increasing attention to the area of religious experience. A chapter on "The Historical Progress of Psychological Study of Conversion" condenses effectively and fairly the findings of outstanding scholars, particularly from William James to our contemporaries. All of them are found wanting inasmuch as the psychological method cannot discover the uniqueness of the Christian experience of conversion. Even men like J. G. McKenzie and Sverre Norborg, who "most nearly approximated the position of the evangelical," display their weaknesses in an overemphasis on the psychological processes. Our confidence must rest in theology; and the Scriptures must be normative. Yet, admits the author, psychology will enable us the better to interpret the various religious emotions that have been involved in the experience of coming to Christ and belonging to him.

Because conversion is comprehensive in character, embracing the totality of man's personality, the author soundly accepts the more modern personality psychology rather than the "faculty" or Gestalt type. This not only, as he says, because conversion cannot rationally be reserved to one faculty of man's personality, but equally because it allows for the interpersonal dimensions in the divine-human encounter. This is the nature of the conversion experience, the new personal center around which personality is to be integrated.

Serious reservations must be held on the author's contention for the crisis conversion experience as the valid one. Instead of a once-for-all crisis, is it not possible that many crises, minor or major, may occur even within the life of the Christian who knows Baptism in infancy as his acceptance into the Christ relationship? These crises may be like unto conversions in all appearance and dynamic, and they may be many in number across the years. Then, too, one asks why conversion must be limited to the conscious experience when psychology is telling us quite clearly that the truly decisive forces

of life lie deep in the unconscious. Failure at these two points is one of the weaknesses of the crisis conversion exponents; and his "rational" method is parallel to the "scientific" method of the psychologist. The working of the Holy Spirit is still the factor that eludes the human mind.

PAUL M. LINDBERG

Teaching the New Testament. By Edna M. Baxter. Philadelphia: Christian Education Press, 1960. 309 pages. \$4.95.

The author describes her work in her *Introduction*: "Part One is devoted to the content of the New Testament arranged to serve a double purpose: as background material for teachers and as reading for young people. Part Two describes a variety of procedures for the use of the New Testament in teaching young people and children of different age levels."

The first 96 pages are a rather typical treatment of the beginnings of the church according to the letters of Paul, the Acts, the Gospels, and the later books of the New Testament. The following 56 pages are "How to Teach Part One to Young People." One gets the impression of a pupil's study book, followed by a leader's guide.

The author, who is head of the department of Religious Education at the Hartford Theological Seminary Foundation, has a wealth of study and experience as background for her writing. The activities she describes are really anecdotes of things that have been done, some of them in her Sunday School of Religion. The underlying principles, of course, are up to the minute, with a possible exception. Is there a subtle distinction in the fact that the title is *Teaching the New Testament* instead of *Using the New Testament in Teaching*?

The volume can be used profitably by advanced students in educational use of the Bible. It is recommended for church school libraries where the more interested and capable teachers can refer to it when they wonder what to undertake and how to proceed in their units if they wish to use the New Testament creatively.

RALPH D. HEIM

The Hammer of God. By Bo Giertz. Rock Island: Augustana, 1960. 335 pages. \$3.75.

This is, as the subtitle states, "a novel about the cure of souls," written by an eminent bishop of the Church of Sweden and superbly translated by an American pastor, Clifford Ansgar Nelson. This is a novel of the Odesjo parish in three episodes, or through three generations, and is woven around the spiritual pilgrimage of three young pastors. Savonius, Fridfeldt, and Torvik in their ministry of law and gospel to troubled souls. With the deftness of the artist, yet with the discernment of a theologian who loves the Word, the sacraments, and the church, the author depicts the shortcomings, the bewilderment, and the glory of the undershepherds who are to tend the flock for the Great Shepherd. Bo Giertz has the parish, both pastors and people, move through the distortions that come from revivalism, rationalism, and secularism, and he discloses in the development of the pastors themselves as well as of the people what the power of the gospel can achieve.

In an age when interest in psychiatry threatens to reshape the image and role of the parish pastor, the book ought to be read carefully and perhaps re-read by every pastor. It ought also be placed in the hands of every troubled soul and every earnest Christian. It should be an assigned reading in every seminary course of pastoral care.

The author's gift lies in laying bare the inner struggles that dog a man en route to a peace with God through Christ. This he describes in concrete situations, among which the dream, or nightmare, which served to bring young Pastor Torvik into obedient fellowship with his Lord is perhaps the most striking portrayal of a soul's conflict.

ALVIN N. ROGNESS

Die Eucharistie als Entfaltung der Verba Testamenti. By Hans-Christoph Schmidt-Lauber. Kassel: Johannes Stauda-Verlag, 1957. 234 pages. DM 22.

This book deals with what was anciently called the Mass of the Faithful. It consists of a scholarly, detailed exegetical study of the New Testament record of the institution of the Lord's Supper and of a careful survey

of the history of this part of the Liturgy from the days of the Fathers to the present. On the basis of his scriptural and historical findings the author subjects the Lutheran liturgy to a constructively appreciative, yet rigorously critical, appraisal. He arrives at the conclusion that Luther's reform of the liturgy is inadequate, that while Luther did restore many evangelical features that had been obscured or even lost in the Middle Ages, he also uncritically took over doubtful elements from the Roman Mass and made changes that are anything but improvements. Among the weaknesses which the author purports to find in Luther's two services he names the absence of an adequate Preface, the absence of a eucharistic prayer, the isolated position of the Words of Institution, the implication that the "consecration" is effected by the recitation of the Words of Institution, Luther's re-arrangement of the order of some of the parts, and the consequent re-interpretation of the meaning here of the Lord's Prayer, the Pax, and the *Angus Dei*. The author also deplores Luther's lack of interest in a common Lutheran liturgy.

It is high time that the Lutheran Church should re-appraise her liturgical heritage and create a common liturgy that is at once scripturally, doctrinally, and historically authentic and fit to serve the worship needs of the church in our day. Much has of course been written on the subject. But this reviewer knows of no study in which all the essential material from the New Testament record and the history of the liturgy needed for a re-examination of the Lutheran rite has so expertly been brought together as Dr. Schmidt-Lauber does here in a single volume, and in such lucid form. From now on anyone concerned with the subject will have to take this scholarly volume into account.

But this business of improving the liturgy dare not be undertaken too lightly. The service which our Lord gave his disciples must have been brief and simple. In the night when his familiar association with his own was about to come to an end, our Lord put his almighty power into the service of his love and created a means by which, from then on until that time when all his own shall see him face to face in glory, he and they might from time to time enjoy the most intimate communion possible this side

of heaven, a foretaste of the joy that will be theirs when they dwell with him in the new creation. The essential elements that make up this unspeakably glorious mystery are two: (1) his word of power and promise, "This is," which once and for all time created the sacrament, and (2) his command to us, "This do." If this is correct, then all that is necessary on our part is (1) that we obediently *do* what he commands and (2) that in thankful faith we *accept* what he gives. It was later generations that added embellishments and also distortions of their own. And whenever succeeding generations, confronted with this long and involved history of the liturgy, have attempted to select the elements which would go together to make up an ideal rite, they have not found it easy to distinguish the essentials from the embellishments and the right from the wrong. For instance, in our day most Lutheran scholars agree that the Lutheran rite would be improved by the addition of a eucharistic prayer. No doubt a worthy, evangelical prayer of thanksgiving, in all respects harmonious with the other parts of the Lutheran rite, is desirable. But the trouble is that in our day the opinion is rather common—and the author of this volume shares it—that such a eucharistic prayer should also include the ancient epiclesis, a prayer in which the Holy Spirit is invoked to come down upon the elements in order that they might be to the communicants the body and blood of Christ. And that certainly would not be an improvement of what we have. If Lutherans should add such a prayer to their rite, they would merely be exchanging the Western error (consecration by the recitation of the Verba) for the Eastern error (consecration by the invocation of the Holy Spirit). Besides, there is nothing wrong with our present use of the Verba so long as it is understood in the spirit of our Confessions. Actually, neither our recitation of a formula nor our invocation of the Holy Ghost is required to make the Lord's Supper the Lord's Supper. Our Lord's living presence in his sacrament, in which he gives us his body to eat and his blood to drink, is a complete and perfect miracle which he wrought once and for all time by the power of his almighty word and promise when he

said, "This is." There is no need for us to do anything but to accept this great and glorious and perfect gift with thanksgiving.

More might be said. For instance, Dr. Schmidt-Lauber's over-emphasis on the eucharistic prayer puts the sacrament itself in the shade. He goes too far in his criticism of Luther's interpretation of the Pax. The term "consubstantiation," which he uses to describe the Lutheran view, has by English-speaking Lutherans long since been rejected as inadequate. All of which goes to show that much more work remains to be done. In the meantime it is enough to see that it is in progress. And scholarly contributions such as this study justify the hope that our church, too, will in time achieve a common liturgy, one that will be scripturally, doctrinally, liturgically authentic and that will be fit to serve the worship needs of the church in our day.

SAMUEL F. SALZMANN

The Sermon and the Propers. Vol. III, Trinity Season, First Half; and Vol. IV, Trinity Season, Second Half. By Frederick H. Lindemann. St. Louis: Concordia Publishing House, 1959. \$4.50 per volume.

Those who have referred to the first two volumes of this series on the sermon and the propers have been looking with eager anticipation to the completion of the series. It is a favor which Dr. Lindemann literally owed the church, and which is now received with deep appreciation by those who are concerned with letting the sermon and the total ministry of preaching find its rightful place in the life of the church.

What was said by commendatory reviews of the first two volumes dealing with the first half of the church year, might be repeated almost verbatim in a statement about the two final volumes; for they continue on the same sound note and in the same able manner to round out the picture of preaching which can be fully understood only in the context and against the background of the whole church year. The sermon must find itself in the context of liturgy. And liturgy is of the larger perspective of the ongoing life of the church. Non-liturgical preaching is less than adequate in helping to

fulfill the full meaning of the church or its worship.

Lindemann's introductory statement, identical in each of these volumes, is a worthy discussion of the underlying principles and philosophy of liturgical preaching. Expanded into a separate and extended volume, it could become an invaluable contribution to Protestant preaching for our time. "The art of liturgical preaching," he says, "has been lost because we have acquired the habit of regarding the sermon not as an integral part of the liturgical action and therefore belonging to the congregation, but as an act of the minister, independent of the work and the eucharistic acts of the faithful." The sermon, except for the high festivals, seldom has relation to the pericopes, and less often does it relate to the Lord's Supper. These suggest that careful review must be given to the whole problem of preaching, as it concerns the faithful as well as the outreach of the Gospel.

The sermon aids presented by Dr. Lindemann for the season of Trinity, including all the special days, are in no sense "first aids" to the hurried preacher. They are notes on the propers for each day, intended to lead the preacher into grappling with basic substance. They are primary and uncluttered; they deal with ultimates, and only secondarily with so-called "relevancies"; they speak in the focus of what God has done in Christ rather than what man must do. After all, there is no other principle for sound preaching.

PAUL M. LINDBERG

In His Likeness. By G. McLeod Bryan. Richmond: John Knox Press, 1959. 192 pages. \$3.00.

This symposium is constructed around the central theme of *The Imitation of Christ*, commonly ascribed to Thomas à Kempis. Beginning with the Gospels, and reaching down to our own day, the author has as-

sembled excerpts of writings by fathers, saints, and scholars which bear on this central theme. Each of the selections included has been prefaced by a brief introduction, biographical, historical, or theological, as the case may be. These introductions help to locate the writer in the broad stream of the church's life.

In such a stream one notices contributions from persons who were otherwise quite unlike one another: mystics and missionaries, prelates and peasants, poets and prosaic men, theologians and writers of simpler frame. Francis of Assisi and Thomas Aquinas are neighbors here, as are Luther and Ignatius Loyola, or Evelyn Underhill and Dietrich Bonhoeffer. Oh, the facility of makers of symposia! But rather, oh, the unity of good men when they focus their attention upon central matters!

GEORGE R. SELTZER

Everyday Prayers. By William Barclay. New York: Harper & Brothers, 1959. 128 pages. \$2.50.

The arrangement of the daily devotions in this little book is both simple and pleasing. The prayers possess qualities of directness and warmth. Cast in the plural, they are appropriate for brief prayers in the family. We recognize in them reality and application to the ordinary concerns of life.

There are prayers for thirty days: morning and evening prayers, and a daily reading from the Bible. In addition, there are appointments for four Sundays and for festivals and days of significance for the family. At the end of the book there is a list of Bible readings for the year, arranged according to the day and the month; these readings may be used as alternates to those which are printed out with the daily prayers.

One can commend the author for giving us an attractive and useful work of devotion.

GEORGE R. SELTZER

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